University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019
2011

The Israeli Military's Key Relationship To Hezbollah Terror
Mazen Kurdy
University of Central Florida

Part of the Political Science Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Kurdy, Mazen, "The Israeli Military's Key Relationship To Hezbollah Terror" (2011). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations, 2004-2019. 1861.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/1861

THE ISRAELI MILITARY’S KEY RELATIONSHIP TO HEZBOLLAH TERROR

by

MAZEN KURDY
B.S. University of Central Florida, 2002

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Masters of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2011

ABSTRACT
This research examines the establishment and expansion of Hezbollah. It uses a policy
perspective in explaining the growth of this organization. Moreover, it focuses on Israel’s
disproportionate use of force in Lebanon as a major cause behind the very existence of
Hezbollah. The analysis of Israeli policy will be done by examining three separate conflicts as
case studies. These events are: the 1982 (Peace for Galilee) invasion of Lebanon that helped to
create Hezbollah, the 1996 (Operation Grapes of Wrath) Hezbollah-Israeli conflict which served
to bolster Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finally the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war which solidified
Hezbollah as a military force in the region.

The first part of the study analyzes the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon to dismantle
PLO bases and the resulting vacuum filled by Hezbollah. In an effort to eliminate Hezbollah,
Israel again invaded Lebanon in 1996 allowing Hezbollah to expand its power based in Lebanon
by providing a number of services including healthcare, financial services, and construction
among others. In 2006, Israel again invaded Lebanon resulting in an increase in weapons
shipments and funding to Hezbollah from Syria, Iran and a number of other countries, further
increasing danger to Israel. These invasions have served to bolster Hezbollah in Lebanon. The
purpose of this thesis is to examine the repercussions of Israeli military invasions in Lebanon.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Hezbollah Today

In the current world system, the concept of a single world government remains an ideal
that has not been fulfilled.

As long as this remains the case, one of the major issues in

international politics will be the state of anarchy that currently exists. This state of anarchy
creates an environment where the theory of “Security Dilemma” remains strongly intact and
plays an important role in international politics. Within the international system today, a state of
anarchy exists where state/non-state actors distrust each other due to reciprocal
misunderstandings. Because of these misunderstandings, security becomes the number one
priority for the survival of the state. Most state actors and many non-state actors attempt to gain
security by acquiring a strong military edge over their opponents. This creates an arms race
whereby real security becomes impossible. In effect, the goal for security creates insecurity.
This is what has become known as the “Security Dilemma”. i
If the ultimate method of securing the state is found through the military buildup of
armaments, the resulting issue becomes at what point does the effort of one state to ensure its
security become perceived to be a threat by another state? If by building up arms one state feels
safe, at what point does it make another state feel unsafe? Since all states currently exist in this
self-help system, low levels of trust exist, further exacerbating the issue.
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One state cannot be

certain that another states’ defensive buildup cannot or will not be used for offensive capabilities.
In the case of Israel, the government has repeatedly proven that it will use its arsenal in an
1

offensive capacity. Moreover, even when used in a defensive capacity, it will do so with the use
of disproportionate force. This behavior exists in an international system, where a lack of
authority in the form of institutions capable of formulating specific rules of behavior and
enforcing those rules within an international consensus continues to exist.
When legal experts use the term "disproportionate use of force," they have a specific
meaning to convey. The former President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The
Hague, Rosalyn Higgins, has noted, proportionality "cannot be in relation to any specific prior
injury - it has to be in relation to the overall legitimate objective of ending the aggression.

iii

While there is no definition that is agreed upon internationally for what is proportionate in
response to militant attacks, “Just War Theory” or “Bellum iustum” , a military ethics doctrine
of Roman philosophical and Catholic origin states that ‘action must not be taken in which the
incidental harm done is an unreasonably heavy price to incur for likely military benefit. Harm
needs to be weighed particularly but not only in relation to the live and well being of innocent
people. The lives of friendly military personnel need to be brought into account, and sometimes
even those of adversaries. The principle of avoiding unnecessary force always applies’.
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Since Hezbollah’s creation in the early 1980s it has been viewed as a terrorist group by
many, especially by Israel and the United States. Begun as a militant group based in Lebanon,
Hezbollah tactics have included kidnapping foreign journalists and suicide bombings, to using
anti-tank rockets and versions of cruise missiles.

Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the

1980s and the subsequent battles that have occurred, many have focused on Hezbollah’s creation
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and its militant actions. With this information, much emphasis has been placed on seeing the rise
of militancy in Lebanon within a vacuum.
Successive Israeli governments have put a strong emphasis on how military strategy can
be used as a solution to the growing power of Hezbollah. However, they have overlooked key
issues as to why Hezbollah has become so strong over the years. For example, were it not for the
Israeli invasion in 1982, Hezbollah may have never been created. Furthermore, the 2006 IsraeliHezbollah war greatly bolstered Hezbollah in the region and solidified its power base due to the
fact that Hezbollah was able to sustain itself against the Israeli military.

These previous

examples point to the fact that Hezbollah power has increased as a direct result of Israeli military
strategy in Lebanon.
It is important to mention that Iran and Syria have both been important conduits for
Hezbollah in Lebanon. For all practical purposes, they have both provided support for Hezbollah
from its inception. Elements such as the rise of religious extremism in response to post-colonial
powers and militant nationalism among others are important factors relating to Hezbollah’s
growth of power. While it is certainly arguable that elements outside of the Israeli military’s use
of disproportionate force assisted in creating a favorable environment for increasing Hezbollah’s
power in Lebanon, this author would like to focus on the extent to which Israel’s use of
disproportionate force has increased Hezbollah’s power over the last three decades. Rather than
examine Hezbollah’s causation through an extremist lens, this author wishes to give an
alternative that shows Hezbollah’s growth in power in Lebanon is directly associated with the
disproportionate use of force by Israel and not due to the rise of religious extremism as others
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have suggested in the past. To provide an examination of this idea, an expansive look will be
taken to show how Israeli military force increased Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon. The primary
purpose of this paper is to explain the rise of Hezbollah power in reaction to Israel’s
disproportionate use of force in Lebanon rather than as a response to religious extremism.

4

Use of Force

I hypothesize that Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon has increased
Hezbollah’s power over the last three decades. . The central focus of this research is to examine
and analyze why Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon has led to the creation of
Hezbollah. This will be done by examining three separate conflicts. The 1982 (Peace for
Galilee) invasion of Lebanon that helped to create Hezbollah, the 1996 (Operation Grapes of
Wrath) Hezbollah-Israeli conflict which served to bolster Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finally, the
2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war which solidified Hezbollah as a military force in the region. The
causal factor here is the Israeli military’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon while the
effect is the increase in Hezbollah power.
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) states that if a country or non-state
actor attacks another country, that country is allowed to defend itself. 5

You cannot however

defend yourself with a disproportionate amount of force. While it is not unheard of for militants
to operate in or near civilian areas, the Israeli military seems to disregard this when operating
against militants.

Furthermore, the targeting of civilians goes against the 1949 Geneva

Conventions. 6 Among many high profile individuals, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Navi Pillar, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy have condemned Israel's
"disproportionate use of force." 7 While there is no agreed upon definition of what constitutes a
proportionate response to attacks, a state is legally allowed to unilaterally defend itself and right
a wrong provided the response is proportional to the injury suffered and is immediate and
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necessary.

It must also refrain from targeting civilians and requires only enough force to

reinstate the status quo. 8
In an interview with an Israeli newspaper, the daily Yedioth, the General Officer
Commanding or GOC Northern Command, Gadi Eisenkot presented his "Dahiyah Doctrine."
This doctrine is an Israeli doctrine of military strategy relating specifically to asymmetrical
warfare in an urban setting.

The doctrine provides for the deliberate targeting of civilian

infrastructure as a means of inducing suffering for the civilian population which thereby creates
deterrence. 9

First used by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the doctrine is named after a

Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut. Dahiyah consisted of large apartment buildings which were
flattened by the IDF during the 2006 Lebanon War. 10 “We will wield disproportionate power
against every village from which shots are fired on Israel, and cause immense damage and
destruction,” Eisenkot stated. 11 Colonel (Res.) Gabriel Siboni recently authored a report through
Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies backing Eisenkot's statements, “as
soon as a clash breaks out, the IDF will have to operate in a rapid, powerful and disproportionate
way against the enemy's actions." 12
The relationship between the variables presented is positive and very strong. Each
separate Israeli invasion into Lebanon positively affected Hezbollah, both politically and
militarily. The theoretical importance of this topic may allow scholars and policy makers to take
a second look into Israel’s disproportionate use of force and rethink the overall use of military
force as a deterrent in Lebanon. The policy importance and significance of this research is that it
may allow policy makers and researchers to redirect their efforts towards finding a peaceful
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solution in the region by analyzing Israel’s use of military force in Lebanon. While Israel has
been able to defeat the armies of the surrounding Arab states, the creation of Hezbollah has
become a thorn in the side of the Israeli military apparatus and after a number of conflicts, Israeli
military actions have yet to be successful. This is the first time a non-state actor has been able to
successfully stand up to Israel.

The Lebanese Dilemma

Since the year 2000, Israel has been implementing a policy founded on the principle that
there is no partner for peace and that its military can impose Israeli will on its adversaries. This
policy has been carried out multiple times against Hezbollah, causing major damage to
economically challenged Shiites in Southern Lebanon and increasingly the country as a whole.
Under the Ottoman Empire, Shiite Muslim rights were not recognized as shown by the formation
of the Kaymakam (districts) in the 1800s. With the outbreak of the 1845 confessional troubles in
the mountains, the great powers, mainly Britain and France, began talks with the Ottoman
authorities to end the conflict. 13 Due to the influence of foreign powers, Shekib Effendi, the
Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, decided to create a mixed council, bringing together
representatives of the various communities of the Lebanon Mountain including the Maronites,
the Greek Orthodox, the Catholics, the Sunnis and the Druze. In the continuation of previous
policies, a Sunni magistrate was chose to represent the Shiite Muslims as well. 14
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Ottoman discrimination continued until the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the
recognition of Shiite Muslims in 1926. While this recognition was a major step forward, the
annexation of peripheral regions of Lebanon also expanded Shiite barriers, as historical Syria
was divided and other religious groups further complicated the makeup of the modern day state
of Lebanon. 15 Receiving increased autonomy under Ottoman rule, “lesser Lebanon,” referring to
Lebanon before its expansion, was able to advance in terms of the development of education,
culture and infrastructure. Private foreign schools began to operate in Beirut, along with Lesser
Lebanon, which was able to advance its infrastructure with a system of roads, a railroad and a
port. Healthcare was strengthened with modern hospitals and an expanded healthcare system. 16

In 1920, the Southern region of modern day Lebanon including the cities of Tripoli,
Saïda, and the Bekaa Valley were annexed. Many of these areas did not want to be added to
greater Lebanon. They historically depended on the former Ottoman state and did not benefit
from the new growth occurring in lesser Lebanon. 17 Cultural and socioeconomic advancement
did not take place as fast as in other localities in Lebanon proper. 18 These annexations created a
disparity that lasted long after the formal declaration of independence of Lebanon in 1943. The
annexations created the environment for a lacking socio-economic situation where the Muslim
Shiite community faced multiple disadvantages. The Lebanese national pact created in 1943
provided a power-sharing agreement amongst the Maronites and Sunni Muslim communities and
led to the marginalization of the Shiite Muslim community in Lebanon. Furthermore, despite the
fact that the Muslim Shiites were now the majority of the population in the peripheral areas, they
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were excluded in the overall development plans of the country’s central authority.

Moreover,

the post Ottoman elite remained in power despite facts on the ground showing major changes in
demographics.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Palestinian factions began establishing themselves in Shiite
Muslim populated areas of Lebanon, further degrading the situation.

These armed Arab-

Palestinian factions were escalating Fedayeen operations against Israel, and in turn, Shiite
Muslim populated areas were taking the brunt of Israeli retaliation. Consequently, many Shiite
Muslims began moving towards the suburbs of Beirut and slowly creating their own
neighborhoods around the capital. During this period, a number of Shiite ulemas (or, “learned
individuals”) began to gain popularity. A number of these ulemas began rapidly distinguishing
themselves by their religious jurisprudence and providing a vision for a better way forward for the
Shiite Muslim population.

Within a very brief span of time, Imam Mussa Sadr distinguished himself as the most
political of the ulemas, vying for influence in the region. Toward the end of the 1960s, Imam
Sadr became the mouthpiece of the Muslim Shiite community in Lebanon. After attempting to
obtain more concessions for his community against the establishment in Lebanon, Imam Sadr
was reduced to a position lacking any real power for his community although he was still
regarded as a threat.

Because of his inability to create real change through the central

government, Imam Sadr decided to create a popular movement, known as the Movement of the
Disinherited.

The goal of this movement was to provide social and political needs to the
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Muslim Shiite community of Lebanon, especially those living in Southern Lebanon and the poor
suburb of Beirut. 19
Just five years after being appointed the first head of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council
(SISC), Imam Sadr gave his defining speech in 1974 where he told a crowd of spectators that the
Shiite community would no longer be divided with allegiances to Arab nationalist parties and
Palestinian factionalism among others. 20 Through action, the Shiites would achieve their goals
of unity and strive to better their socio-economic plight. 21 The Muslim Shiite community in
Lebanon was a prime target for social mobilization because traditionally they lacked any real
power compared to the Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. 22 The Shiite Muslims in
Lebanon were the poorest, least educated, and least likely to benefit from government-provided
services such as health facilities or public utilities. 23 Also because of their location, they were
taking the brunt of the impact of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)-Israeli fighting. The
1979 Iranian revolution provided hope to the Muslim Shiites in Lebanon who were demoralized
and exhausted from the fighting taking place in Lebanon. The revolution provided an illustration
of

what

a

determined

Shiite

effort

against

oppression

could

accomplish.24

The Movement of the Disinherited became the first successful sociopolitical movement
accessible to the Muslim Shiite community since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. While learning
from the armed Palestinian groups striking Israel, Imam Sadr created the armed Afwāj alMuqāwamat al-Lubnāniyyah or (AMAL) militia which was trained by the Palestinians during
the 1970s. This movement coupled with the negative situation of the Shiite Muslim community
in Lebanon and the repeated Israeli interference stemming from Palestinian militants led the way
for the creation and strengthening of the Hezbollah movement. This movement would later
10

overtake AMAL as the strongest of the Muslim Shiite movements and become Israel’s frontline
foe. 25
Iran also provided Hezbollah with substantial material assistance and weaponry to carry
out military operations against Israeli targets. 26 Moreover, it assisted in creating an Iranian based
social service network, which was active in spreading Iranian ideology and generating collective
action. 27 Beginning in the early 1990s, Iran also encouraged and assisted Hezbollah to push into
the Lebanese political sphere. In addition, Hezbollah received significant assistance from Syria.
This came in the form of financing, weapons and a transfer point for Iranian weapons and
training. Syria viewed assistance to Hezbollah as a means to sustain an alliance with Iran and
project its foreign policy goals. 28 This triangular relationship provided a way for Hezbollah to
grow, for Iran to export its revolution throughout the Arab world and for Syria to maintain an
alliance with Iran, creating a stronger force against Israel.

Past Works

The literature dealing with Israel’s use of force in Lebanon is large and consists of a wide
range of authors weighing in from varying disciplines. These authors apply a number of theories
ranging from geopolitical and economic influences to religious and ideological elements. This
thesis will cover a wide selection of previous works explaining Israeli actions in Lebanon.
Because most of the literature in English focuses on how Israel’s use of force has had
constructive results, this study will use this foundation as a source to show how Israel’s use of
force in Lebanon has been counterproductive. This does not mean that no literature exists on
11

Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon however; the majority of the literature focuses
on a lens though which Israel has been justified in its actions. Through this research I will trace
the historical background of Hezbollah and argue that Israel’s disproportionate use of force in
Lebanon has increased Hezbollah’s power. This research will be presented in a chronological
fashion to trace how authors have evolved in their research.
The literature review on Israeli actions begins with Ehteshami and Hinnesbusch. Their
text lays out the framework for understanding Iranian and Syrian foreign policies and the
historical and contemporary reasoning behind the two state alliance. Syria, a secular state that
has used all of its might to push down religious activities in its own country; and Iran, a
theocratic state that has attempted to expand its religious revolution throughout the region have
found a way to create an alliance despite high pressure from powers in the region and abroad.29
This test also explains the unstable environment in which the two countries operate and argues
how Syria is not a rogue nation as so many authors have suggested; rather, Syria is a power
exerting weight in the region based on its own interests. 30
Furthermore, it is argued that Syrian foreign policy follows the realist view and that
through its alliance with Iran, is attempting to counter Israeli interference in Lebanon and
throughout the region. 31 Importantly, the authors explain the factors related to understanding the
Syrian-Iranian alliance and the reasoning behind the intervention in Lebanon. This study also
illustrates how Syria’s actions show it to be a conventional actor using Hezbollah’s influence to
counter Israel in Lebanon. Overall, the author indicates that states such as Syria and Iran are no
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more than middle powers on a world scale attempting to exert increased influence in their own
region. 32
Another view is provided by Cordesman where he suggests explanations for the region in
a strictly militaristic comparison.

The militaries of Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, the

Palestinians and Israel are compared for their effectiveness. The text explains the rise and
importance of asymmetry in conflict and that asymmetric war is not only a risk, it is a constant
reality. After the state to state wars that took place from the 1940s to the 1970s, lower level
guerilla style battles began to take place, lasting over a period of years rather than weeks or even
days. 33

The author expounds on the idea that in an army-to-army battle, Israel would be

triumphant over any of its opponents. On the other hand, in situations of asymmetrical warfare,
the Israelis find more difficulty and this is increasingly becoming the case, especially due to
Hezbollah activities.
As of the date of the texts publication, the author discusses the fact that three major
occurrences of asymmetrical warfare have occurred with Israel. Specifically, the second one
dealing with Shiite militias backed by Syria and Iran and the Israeli army allied with Christian
militias in Southern Lebanon. 34 On the Israeli side, tactics to physically separate Israeli territory
from the enemy have been a major strategy used. These tactics seem to be increasing the fortress
like mentality being proposed by many Israelis. On the other hand, this has also emboldened
Israeli opponents and has led to more attacks on Israeli soil. Moreover, Cordesman explains that
Hezbollah views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an extension of its own conflict with Israel
and this increasingly places Hezbollah within Israel’s radar. 35 These dynamics provide even
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more impetus for Syria to provide support to Hezbollah, using it as a measure of deterrence
against Israel. 36
In another case study Giraldo and Trinkunas stress the fact that financial and material
resources are correctly perceived to be the life blood of Hezbollah’s operations. The United
States government and its allies have determined that along with military action, fighting the
financial infrastructure of Hezbollah is the most direct way to defeat it. 37 While the military
aspect of fighting armed groups is very important, it is also imperative to remember that a great
deal of information has been learned about sources and mechanisms used to finance
organizations such as Hezbollah.
This study looks at Iranian support for Hezbollah as a means of continuing to further its
ideology in the region, particularly in Lebanon. Estimates report that Iran funds Hezbollah with
hundreds of millions of dollars per year. 38 This is accomplished through private charities and
front companies as well as from a number of other sources from around the world; this includes
the United States, and countries in South America and Africa. 39 Iran also provides Hezbollah
with various weapons routed through Syria. These weapons range from assault rifles to rockets.
It has now been cited that Hezbollah is now in control of scud missiles as of 2010. 40 Overall, the
text provides background information on Hezbollah’s well oiled fighting machine including its
media and social outlets aimed at pushing its message not only in Lebanon but through Israel as
well. 41

Parsi stresses the superheated rhetoric and vitriolic exchanges between Iran and Israel.
The author states that the roots of enmity lie between the two nations because of historical details
14

of secret alliances and unsavory political maneuverings that undermine Southwest Asian
stability. 42 While Trita does explain the relations between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, the main
focus rests with Iran’s support for Hezbollah as a way to deal more effectively with Israel.
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 created a power vacuum that allowed Hezbollah to take
hold of the area. This also provided Iran with a gap within which to expand its revolution in the
region. Today, Hezbollah has become the de facto mouth piece of a revolution that occurred
more than 30 years ago.

The scholar also shows the backroom dealings that have occurred between Iran, Israel
and the U.S. such as the U.S. plan to stop Iran from limiting support to Hezbollah. While this
may seem strange at first, it is important to remember that in modern history, Iran and Israel
were strong allies under the Shah but subsequent the Islamic Revolution, the situation began to
change dramatically. This text also talks about Israel’s attempts at keeping good relations with
Iran’s leadership even after the Islamic Revolution. This attempt as continuing relations was
viewed by many as a way of creating alliances against the Arab majority in the region. 43 After
Israel and the U.S. attempted to re-create the power base in the Middle East and the defeat of
Iraq, Iran chose to rid itself of its isolationist stance and choose to become the front line defender
against Israel. Above all, this text is about foreign policy and it chooses to explain Israel and
Iran’s actions in terms of their overall foreign policy goals in the region. 44

Maloney argues that because of the virtue of its size, history, resources, and strategic
location, Iran is of particular relevance for Southwest Asian stability, especially after the Islamic
revolution in 1979. 45 This scholar systematically outlines Iran's sources of influence in the
15

Muslim world, its dealings with Hezbollah and its strategic ambitions, political innovations and
economic clout.

Although Iran’s leadership appears mostly stagnant, except for example, in the

case of Khatami in the 1990s, Iran is in reality one of the least static societies in the Muslim
world. Maloney analyzes the social, economic, and regional forces that are driving Iran toward
change.

Iran also has fluid situations with its neighbors in Iraq and Afghanistan; it feels

threatened and feels that it must control its surroundings through its foreign policy as much as
possible. A primary method used is through its use of Hezbollah in Lebanon. 46

Weyhey explores the strengths and limitations of Iran in relation to Hezbollah in
Southwest Asia. More specifically, he discusses Iran’s attempt to increase its popularity in the
Arab world by using Hezbollah as a proxy in the region. In a sense, he explains, Iran is trying to
be “more Arab than the Arabs.” 47 While Weyhey does explain that Iran and Hezbollah do share
a strategic relationship, he goes further in saying that Iran does not control Hezbollah. Iran does
exert influence over Hezbollah and helps direct its activities but does not have direct control over
the organization. 48 The author shows that Iran is not as strong as it is made out to be in the
general media with regards to Hezbollah. Also, Iran has limited ability with its own military in
terms of being able to perform targeted strikes on its enemies, although it is attempting to
increase its military ability. Due to this fact, it has chosen to back proxy groups that are much
closer to its enemies and are able to exact serious damage deep within the heart of enemy
territory. 49 One such group, Hezbollah, is used in Iran’s revolutionary guard’s “peripheral
strategy” to extend its influence. Overall, if it were not for Israel’s disproportionate use of force
in Lebanon, it is possible that Hezbollah would not exist to counter this strategy today. 50
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Corsi argues that Iran is the largest force behind Hezbollah and that without its support,
Hezbollah would be primarily a Lebanese organization like many others in Lebanon. 51 Although
Israel has fought two indecisive battles with Hezbollah, strategists are still planning on striking
both Hezbollah and Iran despite the low rates of success. The author indicates that Hezbollah
does not have to go through the normal connections that other organizations do in terms of
hierarchy because the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nusrallah, has a direct connection with the
spiritual leader of Iran. 52 The author argues that without Iranian support, there would be no
Hezbollah in terms of its size and power. Although Hezbollah’s creation is arguably due in part
to Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon, Iran’s financial support of has been a major
force allowing it to become the strongest power in Lebanon and one of the strongest military
forces in comparison to Israel. 53 The author also discusses in detail how Israel now feels that it
must preemptively attack Iran at all costs due to its nuclear weapons program. On the Iranian
side, it is felt that Hezbollah can act as a threat to Israel in the case that it chooses to attack
Iranian soil. While Israel is persisting in its reliance on military force, it has consistently missed
the point that this strategy is cause for concern in terms of future repercussions against the Israeli
nation. 54

Goodarzi claims that the Syrian-Iranian alliance created after the revolution in Iran has
had a major impact towards changing and solidifying certain issues in the region, primarily
amongst policies regarding Israel. 55 Furthermore, the study demonstrates that contrary to
prevailing views, cooperation between Iran and Syria has been essentially defensive in nature. It
came about due to a series of developments, such as Egypt’s signing of the Camp David
Accords, the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and
17

continued U.S. interference in the region. This text traces the critical stages of events in the
region leading to the Iranian-Syrian alliances and provides an explanation for the continuation of
this alliance despite efforts at pulling the two powers apart. This author argues that Israel’s use
of military force in Lebanon has only strengthened the resolve of both Syria and Iran.

More

recently, the United States has unsuccessfully focused on attempting to weaken the SyrianIranian alliance in Lebanon. While Hezbollah is key to this alliance, it remains to be seen what
carrot and stick approach can be used to change the situation. 56
Paul discusses the costs of a preemptive foreign policy in Iraq and how strategies such as
containment and deterrence have been gaining traction among many policy makers, especially
those in Israel.

This text offers an agenda for the contemporary practice of deterrence,

specifically regarding Israeli dealings with Hezbollah. It can be argued here that Hezbollah has
become stronger due to Israel’s policy of deterrence in the region. While this provides an
alternate view, it must be taken into account that the deterrence angle has led to varying
outcomes in the region that have not produced positive results.
Israeli military actions have had a negative rather than positive effect in terms of
deterrence. This is true especially for states like Iran. Iran and similar states are attempting to
increase their projection of power in the region at the expense of Israeli military actions. Israeli
strategy has increased the resolve of certain actors such as Hezbollah and provided an impetus
for them to exist. During the Gulf war, Iraq was not deterred from striking Israel with scud
missiles despite the fact that it was known that Israel had nuclear capability. Iran, for example,
may be deterred from striking Israel directly because of its nuclear power capability; though, it
will not deter Hezbollah from striking targets in Israel.
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57

Israeli actions have sent the wrong

signals in the region, especially in terms of asymmetric warfare. In plain speak, non-state actors
do not respond to actions in the same manner as state actors do. 58
These various books cover a wide variety of different viewpoints relating to Israel’s
failure to subdue Hezbollah in Lebanon. Some authors, like Hinnesbusch, see Hezbollah’s rise
as a calculated risk taken by regional actors while other authors such as Giraldo and Trinkunas
take a much more narrow approach and point towards economic causes. Paul argues that preemptive actions by Israel have caused the rise of guerilla movements. Still, other scholars give a
historical line of events where various social, religious and external factors explain how this
movement came to play a huge role in this region of the world. Cordesman discusses Israel’s
military strength against other actors in the region and non-state actor influences. However,
while many authors point to the major role Iran and Syria have had assisting the rise of
Hezbollah, the majority of texts are lacking because they do not point out the extent to which
Israel’s own actions in Lebanon have led to failure and the direct rise of Hezbollah.
The particular gap in the literature that will be covered by this work relates Israeli actions
to Hezbollah’s rise in power. Rather than examine Israeli military force and argue that military
actions have been useful as a deterrent against Lebanon, this author wishes to give an alternative
view that Israel’s disproportionate use of force in Lebanon has been a failure. Israel has not only
assisted in increasing Hezbollah’s power but its subsequent invasions of Lebanon have also
allowed Hezbollah to gain political ground within Lebanon. I will examine the 1982, 1996 and
2006 Israeli invasions of Lebanon and the resulting increase of Hezbollah influence in Lebanon.
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The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon created a catalyst for the creation of Hezbollah.
Subsequent Israeli invasions and interference in Lebanon created even more reasons for the
guerrilla group to organize and act as a buffer against Israel. With the help of Syria and Iran,
Hezbollah has been able to not only resist Israel on a military front, but also on a political level
as well. This factor along with the creation and strengthening of Hezbollah has created a
situation that has led to failure for the Israelis. Still today, Lebanon’s top security positions such
as the head of military intelligence and the director of general security are controlled by Syrian
approved elements. Just recently the Prime Minister’s office in Lebanon was given to a proSyrian ally of Damascus, adding to Hezbollah continuous gain on power.

Process Of Examination

This study will be divided into five chapters, examining the presented topic. The first
chapter will be the introduction. This chapter will present the thesis and introduce the key
parties. It will also provide a background on the subject along with its goals. The second chapter
will attempt to persuade the reader that the policies the Israeli military has implemented have
created many unintended consequences, including popular dissent in the region. Starting with
the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the dislodging of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
and the creation of Hezbollah, chapter two will attempt to explain the history of Hezbollah and
its connection to Israel’s use of force. Second, the Israeli operations of 1996 and 2006 will
attempt to explain the reaction to Israel’s overt use of force against civilian targets in Lebanon,

20

especially the shelling of Qana and the contribution of popular support for Hezbollah from a
wide range of the populace.
The third chapter will focus on Iranian ideology and the policies that the Ulema of Iran
have adopted, leading to the strengthening of Iran in Lebanon and throughout the region.
Hezbollah’s political, social and military support apparatus will be discussed and analyzed to
understand how Hezbollah has been able to achieve success in a relatively short period of time.
Hezbollah’s ability to raise funds in the United States will also be analyzed with examples of
major fundraising acts taking place under the nose of U.S. intelligence.
The fourth chapter will explain how Syria’s role has created an environment where
Hezbollah is able to flourish in Lebanon. With the help of Iran, Syria has been able to exert its
foreign policy goals because of its use of Hezbollah in Lebanon. A brief historical outlook of
Syria in the region will be examined. Also, an examination of the current crises in Syria will be
analyzed. Syria is tied to many organizations in the region and if the current regime were to fall,
Hezbollah would certainly be affected.
The fifth and final chapter will be a conclusion involving a greater understanding of how
Israel’s military use of force is connected to Hezbollah as well as how the militant organization
has come into the forefront of not only Lebanese politics but also the pre-eminent threat to Israeli
security. While no single bullet has increased Hezbollah’s power, Israeli military incursions into
Lebanon may provide insight as to how Hezbollah’s power has increased over the past thirty
years. While both Iran and Syria have also been major instigators in the rise of Hezbollah, it is
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this author’s belief that Israel has played the largest role leading to Hezbollah’s increase in
power.

22

CHAPTER II: LEBANON
Introduction

To provide an examination of the repercussions of Israel’s use of force, an expansive
look will be taken at how Israel’s use of military force has led to the creation and rise of
Hezbollah in Lebanon. The primary purpose of this paper is to explain the rise of Hezbollah
power in reaction to Israel’s use of disproportionate force in Lebanon rather than as Hezbollah’s
creation as a response to religious extremism. Since its founding, Israel has been successful in
cementing its existence in Southwest Asia through the use of military force. Israel has also
managed to restrain the threats from the surrounding Arab states and prove that it is the superior
military power in the region. What Israel has not been able to do is create lasting peace with its
neighbors. Moreover, its disproportionate use of military force has led to intense antagonism
among the civilian population as well as the creation of militant groups such as Hezbollah. Israel
has also used such force against another Palestinian led militant group, Hamas.
In another example of Israel’s failure in asymmetrical warfare, Israel invaded Gaza in
December of 2008 in an operation codenamed, Operation Cast Lead. This invasion of the Gaza
Strip by Israel was in response to repeated rocket fire by Hamas militants into Israel. Israel's
stated goal was to stop the rocket attacks coming into Israel.

59

The resulting report released in

September 2009, stated that both sides of the conflict had committed violations. It also stated
that Israel had used disproportionate force by targeting Palestinian civilians, using them as
human shields as well as destroying civilian infrastructure. Hamas were also found to have
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targeted Israeli civilians by indiscriminately firing rockets into Israel. These findings were
endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council. 60
In September 2009, a United Nations special mission, headed by Justice Richard
Goldstone, produced a report accusing both the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinian militants
of war crimes.

61

In January of 2010, Israel’s government released a response criticizing the

Goldstone Report and disputing its findings.

62

Finally, In 2011, Goldstone partially altered from

the findings of the initial report by stating that he no longer believed that Israel intentionally
targeted civilians in Gaza.

63

The remaining three authors of the report, Christine Chinkin,

Desmond Travers and Hina Jilani, rejected his reassessment. 64 UN Secretary General Ban Kimoon's spokesmen issued a statement stating that while the Secretary-General recognized
"Israel's security concerns regarding the continued firing of rockets from Gaza," "Israel still had
an obligation to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law." The statement
specifically noted that he "condemns the excessive use of force leading to the killing and injuring
of civilians”.

65

Israeli realism is defined by its Jewish heritage and the Jewish Holocaust of World War
II. Because Israel was created by means of war on inhabited land, insecurity has been the preeminent experience. Therefore, Israeli policy has developed in response to a constant threat of
conflict. The key values that Israel must maintain to exist are in constant danger, values such as:
territorial sovereignty, personal survival and national independence as a democracy for Israel’s
Jewish citizens. The Israeli state is in constant fear of being overtaken. Continuous fear of
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attack and defeat are ingrained in the Israeli consciousness, along with the belief that Arabs are
out to destroy Israel. 66
International politics in Israel is seen as a zero-sum game where the belief that human
nature has an ugly side waiting to come out, is well established in Jewish culture and is leading
to mistrust throughout the world. Israeli military strategy is to plan for the worst. Israel’s use of
military force has been justified by the belief that Israel is acting in accordance with defensive
policies based upon an encircling threat.

This reasoning self-justifies its actions as being

defensive rather than offensive military incursions.

Historically, just as Jewish communities

have built barriers to minimize the impact coming from the outside world, separation has also
become equal with the survival of the Jewish state. 67 While Israeli military strategy takes into
account the fact that the state of Israel must be a safe haven from the outside world, it also takes
into account acquisitive aspirations related to widening the barriers of the state of Israel. This
has been a major point of contention leading to the creation of militant groups such as Hezbollah.
Israeli technological advancements have generated superiority over their Arab
opponents and have acted as a credible advantage to the threat of Israeli hegemony in the region.
Historically, Israel fought for its existence knowing that it could use overwhelming force as a
form of diplomacy to impose results. The idea of cumulative deterrents' emphasized the thought
of repeatedly beating your opponent as a way to force permanent acceptance of Israel in the
region.

68

Over time Israel’s disproportionate use of force has been used to effectively bring the

Arabs to the bargaining table using almost any means necessary.
The surrounding Arab states were put on notice and once their land was obtained
through war, no land was given back unless it was overwhelmingly in Israel’s favor, nor would
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the imaginary line drawn in the sand be altered. Israeli strategists put a great deal of value on
holding on to what they have accomplished and forcing the other side into submission. 69

Israel

hoped to create structures from its military actions i.e. buffer zones, security and peace
guarantees. Although it has been a long road, Israel has been very successful through the use of
violence. Due to its use of force, Egyptian strength and a population of millions succumbed to
Israeli superiority by the 1970s. Jordan, with a history of dubious political leadership, also
accepted the fact that Israel could not be defeated through military means. On the Arab side, the
idea that Israel could be decisively beaten in a military battle has slowly come to an end. On the
Israeli side, the idea that military force was Israel’s best friend went unchallenged until the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
Prior to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Israeli strategy changed after the 1967 war where
Israel became the occupier of the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Gaza strip, Sinai and the Golan
Heights. These occupied territories became a point of contention amongst Israeli strategists.
Would they be used as bargaining chips or would they be used to increase Israel’s size and
therefore its buffer zone? 70
This debate has continued to the present day. The more territory Israel has, the more it
has to defend. On the other hand, deterrence using extreme and disproportionate force can work
well without having the need for extended buffer zones. Israel’s realist approach has succeeded
in securing the new state; nevertheless, it has meant that it was not likely to create any real
friendships in the region. Any attempts to increase security by one of Israel’s neighbors meant
that Israel would also increase its own security, creating a never-ending race. Israel’s use of
disproportionate force eventually led Syria and Jordan to put down anti-Israel actions directed
26

from their state; though, one state that encountered problems with this was Lebanon. Lebanon,
from its inception, functioned as a quasi failed state and has been ever since. Lebanon allowed
first the PLO to launch attacks onto Israeli territory, and then after the Israelis invaded Lebanon
in 1982, an even stronger organization developed in the form of Hezbollah. Since that time,
Israel has become engaged in a low level war on its northern border. With occasional serious
flare-ups, Hezbollah has become one of the most serious threats to Israeli security.

Unintended Consequences
Beginning with Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Israel attempted to eliminate the PLO
from Southern Lebanon. This action took place because after the Palestinians were pushed out
from Jordan, they came into Lebanon and shortly took over the Palestinian refugee camps in the
south, converting some into military training grounds. 71 The Palestinians began taking part in
cross-border attacks against Israeli targets from Lebanese territory, as opposed to their previous
strongholds in Jordan.

As Palestinian influence began to increase in Lebanon, the Palestinian

fighters were able to create a state within a state. 72

The Israelis would retaliate with

overwhelming air superiority and bomb Palestinian refugee camps. These airstrikes would often
be accompanied with strikes on the local Lebanese population, specifically Muslim Shiites in
South Lebanon.
As Palestinian attacks began to increase, so did the Israeli response. Had it not been
Israeli practice to use overwhelming force, the surrounding Lebanese population would not have
been affected to such a degree.

Israeli strikes on Lebanese villages were becoming more
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frequent, creating tensions between Israel and the Palestinian Arab fighters as well as the local
Arab population in Lebanon. One example of this occurred on July 10, 1981. After strikes on
Israel by the PLO, Israeli retaliation occurred through Israeli air strikes. 73 On July 17, the Israel
Air Force launched a massive attack on PLO buildings in downtown Beirut. Roughly three
hundred people were killed and eight hundred wounded, the majority of them civilians. 74 The
Israeli army also targeted PLO positions in South Lebanon, hitting local civilians in the process
without being able to stop Palestinian rocket fire. By the mid 1970’s, tensions between the
Palestinian Arabs in Lebanon and local inhabitants came to a head erupting in armed conflict
within Lebanon. As the war continued in Lebanon, the Palestinian militants continued the ebb
and flow of attacks against Israel until the Israeli government decided to put a stop to Palestinian
attacks once and for all.
In 1982, the Israeli government decided to put a stop to Palestinians attacks and began
waiting for a strategic moment. According to George Ball, the seventh U.S. ambassador to the
United Nations, the PLO continued to observe the ceasefire implemented earlier by both Israel
and the Palestinian authority. 75 Alexander Haig, U.S. Secretary of State, also said that Israel
continued to look for an internationally recognizable act that would be necessary to obtain
American support for an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 76

In April of 1982, an Israeli diplomat

was killed in front of his apartment in Paris, increasing tensions. Despite this assassination, the
official premise for the Lebanese invasion was that the Palestinians had managed to acquire
long-range rockets, capable of hitting deeper targets within Israel. Israel’s strategic timing came
about when on June 3, 1982, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov, was
shot and paralyzed by Abu Nidal’s Fatah organization. 77 Although the Abu Nidal group was a
28

main competitor and rival group of Yasser Arafat’s PLO, and the shooting carried out by the
Abu Nidal group was a clear provocation against the PLO, the Israeli cabinet agreed to invade
Lebanon.

Operation “Peace for Galilee”
Ariel Sharon, Israel’s Minister of Defense at the time informed the cabinet that the
invasion of Lebanon would last roughly three days. Israeli troops were not to go deeper than 25
miles into Lebanese territory and they were not to engage Syrian forces stationed in Lebanon. 78
The overall goals of the operation were to eliminate the PLO, install a Christian- Israeli friendly
government in Beirut and limit Syrian interference in Lebanon. Israel’s plans were thwarted
from the onset of military activities. Despite Israel’s military superiority over the PLO, it took
over 48 hours to take over a main PLO stronghold in Sidon. And while the mission was
successful in driving out the Palestinians from Southern Lebanon, the Israeli forces broke their
own rules of engagement of not going deeper than 25 miles and laid siege to the Lebanese
capital, Beirut. 79 Israeli troops surrounded Beirut and bombed PLO positions from the air and
the ground, frequently hitting civilians, many of whom belonged to the Shiite community.
Due to Israel’s extension over its original limited war plan and its disproportionate use of
force in Lebanon, the Israeli army reported that 140 Israeli Defense Force Soldiers (IDF) refused
to serve in Lebanon and were sent to jail. 80 Israel’s plan to install a pro-Israel leader in Lebanon
also came to a halt as the anti-Syrian Bashir Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon and
assassinated one month later.
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While his brother, Amin Gemayel, was elected President by the national assembly,
shortly thereafter, Syria was able to assert its influence, not only militarily against Israel but also
within Lebanon, permanently ending any plans for a Lebanese government friendly towards
Israel. Furthering Israel’s failure in 1982, the IDF was unsuccessful in driving out Syrian forces
and this led to the massive strengthening of Syrian influence in Lebanon. Within a short period
of time, Syria was able to have almost total control of internal and external Lebanese policies.
Israel not only failed to achieve security for its northern border through the “Peace for
Galilee” war, it created a much more potent and longer lasting problem for itself, Hezbollah. As
the war continued, the downtrodden Shiite Muslims of Southern Lebanon became more active
and were able to unite based on similar grievances. Initially, the Muslim Shiites of Southern
Lebanon viewed the IDF as liberators because they were no longer under the tutelage of the
Palestinian forces. Many Muslim Shiites were upset that the PLO was causing the infliction of
damage onto their neighborhoods. Later, the IDF began to align themselves with the Maronite
Christians of Lebanon to the detriment of the Muslim Shiites. This factor, coupled with the
unfortunate fact that the IDF did not withdraw after driving out the PLO caused the Shiites to
rethink their presence.
As a result, the Muslim Shiites turned their attention towards getting rid of the IDF
soldiers and freeing South Lebanon from foreign interference. While the PLO lost its hold on
Southern Lebanon and their forces were transferred to Tunisia, Iran had been longing for the
ability to spread its influence in the Arab world and it found it within the Shiite Muslim
community of Lebanon.

30

During “Operation Peace for Galilee,” the Iranian government sent some 1,500
revolutionary guards (Pasdaran) to the Bekaa valley to train Arab Shiite Muslims in Lebanon.81
With the acceptance of Hafez al-Assad of Syria, the Pasdaran trained the Shiites in the south and
began to reinforce the Ayatollah Khomeini’s insistence on spreading the Islamic Revolution.
The main reasoning behind this was to establish an Islamic revolutionary movement in Lebanon,
mimicking that in Iran and eventually turning Lebanon into an Islamic state. As the Lebanese
war ebbed and flowed, the Pasdaran troops were able to train Hezbollah fighters and turn them
into a united fighting force. Hezbollah was very limited in terms of resources but thanks to Iran,
it was backed militarily, spiritually and financially.
Iran’s financial backing allowed Hezbollah to increase its membership and augment its
standing among the Shiites in Southern Lebanon. Due to the Lebanese government’s inability
and neglect of the Muslim Shiite community, Hezbollah was even able to begin a social welfare
program to enhance its image within the region. 82 This welfare program provides inexpensive
healthcare, rebuilds homes for those affected by Israeli strikes, and provides income assistance to
those who have lost family members while fighting the Israelis. All of these actions have
increased Hezbollah’s popularity in South Lebanon.

Hezbollah even provides discount

supermarkets, scholarships for college, and schools for the needy. 83
It is also interesting to note that during the late 1980s, Iran’s leadership changed hands
from Ayatollah Khomeini to a more moderate Hashemi Rafsanjani. The result of this was the
replacement of the hard-line Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sheik Subhi al-Tufayli with the
more moderate Sheik Abbas al-Musawi in 1990. After a mere two years of leading Hezbollah
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and moderating Hezbollah’s stance in the region, an Israeli air raid killed both al-Musawi and his
wife along with their child and a number of bodyguards.
In his place, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah was appointed to take the position. As a moderate,
Nasrallah and the Iranian leadership wanted Hezbollah to enter into the Lebanese political arena.
Hezbollah entered the 1992 parliamentary elections and were successful in gaining eight seats
including 4 Shiite Muslims, as well as 2 Sunni Muslim and 2 Christians running on the
Hezbollah ticket. This provided Hezbollah with the largest bloc in parliament. 84
Despite all of the repercussions of operation “Peace for Galilee,” the Israelis did not learn
from their mistakes. Once the war was over, Israel had succeeded in dislodging the PLO from
Southern Lebanon but had failed to install an Israeli friendly government. It is estimated that
almost 18,000 Lebanese were killed during the first year of the invasion alone. The war itself led
to the emigration of over 850,000 Christian Lebanese, leading to a continual change in
demographics against Israeli interests in Lebanon. 85 The Shiite Amal organization created by alSadr, stopped fighting the PLO and switched its allegiances due to Israel’s disproportionate use
of force and the killing of many Muslim Shiites in Lebanon. Most importantly, the Israeli
invasion led to the creation of Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Syria.

Operation “Grapes of Wrath”
While low-level conflict continued between the IDF and Hezbollah fighters for many
years, combat remained within the confines of South Lebanon. Despite this fact, the Israeli
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government was again looking to invade Lebanon and this time put a stop to Hezbollah fighters
as they had done to the PLO just over a decade before. On March 30, 1996, two men working on
a water tower in Yater, Lebanon were killed by an IDF missile strike. Hezbollah retaliated by
launching twenty missiles into northern Israel and the IDF later acknowledged that the attack on
Yater was a mistake. Next, a roadside bomb killed a 14-year-old Lebanese boy and injured three
others in Barashit, a village in Lebanon. Hezbollah again retaliated by firing 30 missiles into
northern Israel. Two days later, on April 11, 1996, Israel announced the “Grapes of Wrath”
operation as a retaliatory invasion against Hezbollah.
Israel wanted to punish the general Lebanese populace for supporting Hezbollah and it
thought that by making the Lebanese public suffer, it would distance them from Hezbollah. This
would also force the Lebanese government to put more pressure on Hezbollah to stop its
activities. Moreover, the Israeli Defense Force was to create disorder in the south, creating an
untenable situation for Hezbollah. On April 11, 1996, Israeli aircraft and artillery began the
bombardment of Southern Lebanon, multiple targets in and around Beirut and the Bekaa Valley.
The IDF conducted air raids on Hezbollah installations as well as civilian infrastructure.
By the April 13, Israel had blocked major Lebanese ports, including the ports of Sidon,
Beirut and Tyre.

Within 48 hours of the blockade, the civilian electric power stations of

Bsaleem and Jumhour were bombed and destroyed. Multiple bridges were bombed and over
2,000 civilian homes were destroyed in Southern Lebanon alone. The total economic damage
was estimated at over half a billion dollars. Israel also estimated the total damage it suffered at
just over 50 million dollars. 86
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The Shelling of Qana

On April, 18, some 800 civilians were taking refuge in a United Nations compound in
Qana. Hezbollah fighters, hundreds of meters away, fired multiple rockets and mortars at Israeli
troops. In response, Israel fired 38 shells within 15 minutes of the shelling, many equipped with
fuses allowing them to detonate above ground. 87 As a result of this bombing, 106 civilians were
killed, including 24 children, with scores wounded. 88 Despite numerous reports from Amnesty
International, the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and others, reflecting on the flagrant use
of force by Israel in the region, the Israeli government firmly placed the blame on Hezbollah.
While Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, attempted an information campaign to push
the Lebanese to distance themselves from Hezbollah, the attempt backfired and nearly the entire
countries’ religious and political establishment rallied around Hezbollah. Also, both Christians
and Muslims took part in daily protests in favor of Hezbollah in addition to providing donations
for the Islamic Resistance. 89
This “rally around the flag” effect, coupled with the Qana massacre, not only kept
Hezbollah in place but also solidified it in the Lebanese political structure as well. Israel’s
attempts at creating a gap between the general population and Hezbollah by using
disproportionate amounts of force to compel civilians to point the finger at Hezbollah backfired.
This turned not only the country, but the world’s attention towards Israel’s justifications for
using extreme force.
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The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War

Explaining the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war, Israeli actions proved to be a failure for Israel
and a success for Hezbollah.

Primarily, Israel’s military objectives were to re-establish

deterrence despite having failed in the 1996 conflict and to eliminate Hezbollah’s ability to
threaten Israel. Furthermore, Israel wanted to obtain the release of its captured soldiers, the
catalyst that sparked the 34 day conflict. Similar to Israel’s goals in 1996, “Operation Grapes of
Wrath,” Israel sought to pressure the Lebanese public by making them suffer from a
disproportionate use of force. 90
The punishment strategy used by Israel also consisted of a psychological warfare
campaign. Israeli psy-op units were able to send messages to mobile phones across the south,
they also hijacked phone lines and sent Lebanese civilians Israeli-based phone calls as well as
cell phone text messages telling the locals to show their disapproval of Hezbollah.

Israel

activated psychological warfare units to execute operations within Lebanon as well. 91

They

attempted unsuccessfully to shut down the al-Manar television station by bombing it. This
strategy was created to put Hezbollah in a negative light within Lebanon and attempt to gain
support from the Lebanese population.

Israel deleted Hezbollah websites and set up false

websites appearing to be backed by Hezbollah. They also managed to put up negative messages
on official Hezbollah websites and dropped leaflets attempting to appeal to Lebanese civilians to
stop supporting Hezbollah.
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92

Figure 1 Israeli pamphlet showing how Hezbollah is taking Lebanon into the abyss

Similarly to “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” Israel used disproportionate force as a strategy
to achieve its goals. Israeli airpower was used throughout the south of Lebanon so as to limit
casualties on the Israeli side. Weapons used to target Hezbollah were also used to cause harm to
the civilian population so that they would point the finger at Hezbollah and blame them for
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Israeli actions. Israel did not want to commit ground forces due to their losses in the 1996 war
which signaled weakness, further emboldening Hezbollah fighters.
Israeli experts commented that the damage inflicted against Lebanon’s civilian
population weakened the effects of Israel’s use of military force against Hezbollah. 93

Israeli

airstrikes resulted in over $7 billion in damage to Lebanon, over 1,200 civilian deaths and over
130,000 civilian structures destroyed. 94

Due to these results, it is plausible that the

disproportional use of force committed by Israel in Lebanon increased the anger of the majority
of the Lebanese population as well as the Arab and Muslim world. This created even more
backing for Hezbollah. 95

Hezbollah was able to provide more social and civil services to the

south than the central Lebanese government and this was a major factor in their support of the
organization.
Militarily, Israel wished to eliminate Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal and stop the threat of
rocket fire into northern Israel. Consequent to the Israeli invasion, Hezbollah was able to launch
approximately 4,000 rockets into northern Israel during the 34-day period.

Thousands of

Israelis were forced into bomb shelters and over half a million people were displaced from their
homes. 96 Moreover, Hezbollah was able to prove itself as a fighting force and was provided the
opportunity to improve its military capabilities through lessons learned from 1996. Syria and
Iran were more than happy to replenish its medium and long-range rocket arsenal. 97 Hezbollah’s
success also provided a strong impetus for Syria and Iran to step up their financial and military
support. This also created an example for Hamas in the Gaza strip. They were able to see the
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affects of Hezbollah on Israel’s military offensive. This provided an impetus for Hamas and
similar groups to imitate Hezbollah and also fall under the patronage of Iran and Syria.
Once again, Israel was unable to change the political atmosphere in Lebanon and
therefore failed to pressure the Lebanese government to force Hezbollah’s hand. 98 Additionally,
Israel failed to obtain the release of the two captured soldiers, which sparked the entire conflict.
Israel also suffered psychological setbacks as well. Israel permanently lost its air of invincibility.
The government and the military were criticized for underestimating Hezbollah’s abilities,
overestimating their own capabilities, as well as not sufficiently preparing for the war.

99

Regionally, Israel’s use of disproportionate military force in Lebanon lost the historic backing of
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan although they all initially condemned Hezbollah and firmly
blamed it for the conflict. As Lebanese civilians continued to die and as the gruesome pictures
began to steadily flow throughout media outlets, Arab public opinion grew immensely against
Israel’s bombing campaign in Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s Arsenal

After Israel’s 1996 invasion into Lebanon, Iran and Syria began resupplying Hezbollah
with even more state-of-the-art weaponry, reconnaissance equipment and more rockets.
Hezbollah had proven itself to be a respectable fighting force, able to use sophisticated weaponry
and remain standing after numerous battles with the IDF. According to Israeli intelligence,
planes carrying sophisticated weapons, including long-range Zelzal missiles from Iran have been
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passed onto Hezbollah through Syria. 100 During the 2006 invasion, the Israeli Army struggled
for many weeks to defeat Hezbollah forces and was ultimately unsuccessful prior to a cease-fire
being imposed. Although Hezbollah remained a small militia, it trained like an army and was
equipped accordingly by Iran and Syria.

Among many items, Hezbollah has been equipped with flak jackets to limit injuries and
deaths of its soldiers, night-vision goggles to spot Israeli targets under the cover of darkness,
state-of-the-art communication equipment to be able to transfer information to fellow fighters,
Israeli uniforms to blend in with the IDF during chaotic battles, and even Israeli ammunition. In
the period of a few years, Hezbollah has gone from a small resistance organization to a
sophisticated and well equipped group of fighters.

Iran has also provided Hezbollah with Russian-made antitank missiles that have damaged
or destroyed Israeli tanks, including its most modern tank, the Merkava, known as Israel’s
indestructible tank. 101 Hezbollah has also been equipped with antitank missiles including the
older Sagger missile. This missile has been used successfully to fire into and bring down houses
where Israeli troops are hiding. Hezbollah fighters also use a large-scale system of underground
tunnels to move around throughout Southern Lebanon.

These booby trapped tunnels are

especially useful for soldiers to fire at Israeli targets and then disappear back into the
underground. Tactics such as these were learned from Chechen fighters combating invading
Russian troops while successfully using the Grozny sewer system to evade capture after attacks.
Syria and Iran have also continued to provide satellite communication systems to Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has additionally become attuned to gathering intelligence, learning guerrilla-style
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warfare from events such as the American Revolution, from rebel groups such as the Vietcong,
and texts such as those written by Mao and Che. 102 Very importantly, Hezbollah fighters are
trained based on methods learned from the West, mimicking as much as they can from United
States’ soldiers on the battlefield.

It is also known that Hezbollah has its own separate telephone system throughout
Lebanon. This phone system came under intense scrutiny in 2008 when Iran had used an Iranian
company that was rebuilding homes that were destroyed during the 2006 war, to lay cables for
the Hezbollah network. Further claims were made that these cables would link all the militias in
Lebanon, Syria and Iran. According to a Lebanese government report, the network is capable of
tracking 100,000 numbers using a digital format in which each number is five digits long and
hooks up to Lebanon’s central telephone network. 103

Through professional training from the Pasadaran, Hezbollah has proven that it can
successfully use generally low-tech antitank and infantry weapons, as well as more high-tech
Semtex plastic explosives. 104 The IDF says that Hezbollah has between 2,000 to 4,000 fighters,
aided by a larger circle of backup personnel who provide storage of weapons in nearby homes
and civilian buildings. They also provide logistics assistance throughout the region. 105
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Remarks

Hezbollah is very difficult to fight against because it operates like a revolutionary force.
It fights within civilian areas, making it hard to attack without hitting civilian populated areas.
Fighters are trained to set up launchers, fire them and immediately leave the area. This makes it
very difficult for Israel to strike legitimate targets. Furthermore, this provides more incentive for
Israel to strike those Hezbollah launching sites and blame it on the Hezbollah fighters, leading to
large casualties. The Pasdaran has assisted Hezbollah to train and fight like an army, with
special units for antitank warfare, explosives, engineering, intelligence, communications and
launching rockets. The Pasdaran has also taught Hezbollah how to build and use “improvised
explosive devices” (IED) as well as fire the all important C-802, ground-to-ship missile that was
successfully used in 2006. 106

Iranian Air Force officers have also been sent to Lebanon to train and assist Hezbollah in
using Iranian made medium-range missiles such as the Fajr-3 and Fajr-5. Syria has provided
Hezbollah with 220 millimeter and 302 millimeter missiles both being equipped with
antipersonnel warheads. Syria has also acquired Russian made antitank weapons and passed
them to Hezbollah ever more slightly changing the military balance of the region. 107 Such
examples include the Metis wire-guided missile, with the ability to fire up to four rounds per
minute and the RPG-29, used both as an antitank round with the ability to penetrate armor as
well as the ability to be used against soldiers.
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Hezbollah has been successful in destroying the myth that Arab armies have helped to
create through over 40 years of battle, that the IDF is unbeatable.

Despite sophisticated

American weaponry, highly skilled Israeli training and the solid friendship of the world’s only
superpower, Hezbollah has been able to remain standing against Israeli military action. The act
of being able to get back up after Israel’s use of overwhelming force has turned Hezbollah into a
mythical force in the region and throughout the world. Hezbollah has been able to prove itself,
not only on the battle field, but in the social and political sphere as well.

Each time it is tested by Israeli firepower, Hezbollah manages to come out ahead. After
the 2006 war, Hezbollah is much better equipped with sophisticated weaponry provided by Iran
and Syria. It is also widely believed in the region that Turkey is covertly assisting Iran to
smuggle weapons into Syria. These sophisticated weapons end up in the hands of Hezbollah
fighters. 108 Due to a number of factors, including Turkish public opinion relating to the overt use
of military force used in Israel, the Turkish government has begun to revise its international
strategy. This strategy includes not being as friendly to Israel as past governments have been,
further isolating Israel in the region and proving further that Israel’s disproportionate use of force
has backfired on the Israeli state. It can be argued that Israel did succeed in splitting Lebanon
into two separate political camps. One group constitutes a majority Shiite Muslim constituency
suffering the most from the Israeli incursions; and a separate group made up of Sunni Muslims
and Christians, living a more affluent lifestyle, and blaming Hezbollah for the Israeli attacks that
have befallen the country.
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CHAPTER III: IRAN
Introduction

While Hezbollah traces its origins back to Najaf, Iraq, it owes its creation to an Israeli
operation in Southern Lebanon, intent on eliminating the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) and installing a Christian-led, Israeli-friendly government in Beirut. As Iran's war with
Iraq weakened the more liberal elements in Iran, the religious clerics began to gain ground. The
clerics believed that the only way to protect the Islamic republic from their adversaries was by
exporting the Islamic revolution throughout the region. The two immediate geographic locations
were Iraq and Lebanon. Iraq however, was not an easy target to export to because of President
Saddam Hussein and his secular Bath regime along with the Iran-Iraq war. In this case, Iran
lacked the personnel, channels and institutions that could operate within the country to spread the
ideas of the revolution.
The second location thought of as a prime location to export the ideas of the Islamic
revolution was Lebanon.

Although the Amal movement, led by Musa al Sadr, had been

established from the beginning under the slogan of putting an end to the suffering and
deprivation of the Shia sect in Lebanon, they did not recognize the Iranian concept of 'Wilayate-Faqih' or Guardianship of the Scholar, a religious mode of government because of the multireligious makeup of Lebanon. Iran, on the other hand, realized that the Amal movement, mainly
composed of political activists, was not most efficient method of exporting the revolution.
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In response to the Amal issue, Iran decided to create a new party based on the
membership of religious clerics. Since Amal was not supportive of the Wilayat-e-Faqih, its
members were classified as secularists and non-believers causing many of them to abandon the
movement. These individuals began to obtain a more religious orientation with backing from
Iran which later led them to become members of Hezbollah. The formation and activities of
Hezbollah were also expedited with the 1982 Israeli invasion. While it is apparent that Iran
drove the activity behind the creation of Hezbollah, it is this author’s intention to show that the
Israeli invasion created the impetus for Iranian influence in Lebanon, leading to the increase of
Hezbollah’s power. Although Hezbollah’s creation was fragmented and occurred over a longer
period of time, for the purposes of this work, the formation date of the resistance movement will
be referred to as 1982; this is for many reasons, primarily, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 109
Among modern day phenomena, Hezbollah, it can be argued, owes its rise to the steady
yet wide scale decline of Arab civilization and its failure to meet the global challenges of living
in a modern Western-dominated world. 110 Initially, Hezbollah was able to present itself as the
key for making life better for hundreds of thousands of downtrodden Shiites throughout
Lebanon. It was not until recently that Hezbollah became the rallying point for millions of
Muslims and Arabs throughout the region, as well as Christians in the Levant. Although it was
not a recognized group until the middle of the 1980s, Hezbollah had been operating for a number
of years, primarily as an umbrella for different groups within the region. Hezbollah’s first
members were a number of fledgling volunteers consisting of disaffected Muslim men adhering
to Shiite Islam as well as a number of Iranian style educated alims, otherwise known as “the
knowledgeable ones.” 111
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As Hezbollah began to create its own agenda, Iran had a hand in coordinating and
controlling Hezbollah activities, especially during the 1980s. Iran’s influence was clear in the
open letter to “The Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World”. The document is purported to
be written in Iran by a one-time member of the pro-Khatami reform movement in Iran. The
letter declared the world to be divided between the oppressed and the oppressors, mainly the U.S.
and Israel as the oppressors. 112 Though Iran and Syria are widely given credit for Hezbollah’s
rise, Iran has been the main forbearer of Hezbollah’s ideology.
Moreover, the crucial fact is that Israel’s use of force can also be linked as part and parcel
of the creation of Hezbollah. Was it not for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) bases
in Lebanon, and Israeli attempts at dislodging them, the fragile Shiite community living in the
slums of Southern Lebanon may have not been given the necessary reasons to guard themselves
against the incoming Israeli onslaught.

Secondarily,

was it not for Israel’s continued

occupation of Southern Lebanon, the Shiite community would have had less of a reason to take
up arms against the foreign invaders. These facts, coupled with the mentality of the rulers in the
region, that leaders do not represent the aspirations of their people, leads other powers to come
about that will look after the needs of the people in a manner more conducive to their
demands. 113 Until the recent cases of Tunisia and Egypt, this was systematically true throughout
the region. It is important to note that a number of Arab regimes are also going through
transitions relating to the Arab Spring at this time.
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Iranian Ideology

For all practical purposes, modern Iranian-United States relations came about, due to the
modern day United States, CIA engineered coupe of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in
1953. Mossadegh was an ardent nationalist and opposed to the future of the United Kingdom’s
long-term oil concessions, which in fact controlled Iran’s major natural resource. 114
Mossadegh accepted to become the prime minister of Iran under the auspices that the
Iranian parliament would end the oil concessions, which did not occur until 1951. Mossadegh’s
nationalization of Britain’s Anglo-Iranian Oil Company showed him to be unreliable and a threat
to Western interests, along with the fact that the Soviet Union was just around the corner. The
President of the United States at the time, Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a coup plan, and
although previous attempts failed, on August 19, 1953, a CIA officer directed an intricate plan
against Mossadegh and succeeded in removing him, marking U.S. foreign policy goals in Iran.
This action not only succeeded in implanting the shah of Iran, it also created a generation of
Iranians that grew up knowing that the CIA had installed him. 115
By the time John F. Kennedy became president of the United States in 1961, the United
States was well on its way to changing Iran’s social fabric. The United States argued that Iran’s
land-tenure system was akin to “feudalism,” and that it was creating an environment that would
allow for a communist revolution. Under American pressure, the shah pushed for a so-called
“White Revolution.” This revolution brought about unexpected repercussions that both the
United States and the Shah did not foresee. The same backers that helped push out Mossedegh
were not in favor of the changes to the land-tenure system. Moreover, the Shah also proposed
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the political emancipation of women, modeled after those proposed years earlier by Mustapha
Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, angering the more conservative elements within Iran. Riots broke out
when it became obvious the election was rigged and a national referendum showed ninety-nine
percent approval for the measure.
The Iranian mainstream began to notice what the Shah and his reforms were creating.
The modernization program was creating an ultra-wealthy status of elites within Iran, many of
whom were part of the royal family. These reforms brought about the ascendance of a relatively
unknown cleric, Rohallah Khomeini. Khomeini became so popular through his fiery sermons
against the Shah in Iran that he was eventually sent into exile and forced from Iranian territory,
first to Iraq and then to France. 116
As Iran and the United States strengthened their alliance throughout the 1970’s, Israel
was also able to create ties with the Shah. This created a backlash not only amongst Iran’s Arab
neighbors, but also amongst Iranians themselves. Iran’s ability to maintain the status quo along
with its relationships with the U.S. and Israel brought it much admiration from the U.S., so much
so that Iran was considered to be an “Island of Stability” in relation to its neighbors.117
Nevertheless, the Shah’s crumbling regime began to show signs of fatigue after the Shah
approved a publication highly critical of Khomeini.
Surprisingly, the Shah’s secret police, the SAVAK, notoriously known for their heavyhanded tactics and for torturing opponents, were incapable of stopping the rising tide of
dissention. Adding fuel to the fire was Israel’s known relationship to the SAVAK. Out of an
increasing animosity between the Shah and the Arab states, Israel had helped train members of
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the SAVAK. In fact, this relationship helped influence increasingly popular enmity toward
Israel. Approximately, one year later, in January of 1979, the Shah was forced to flee Iran. A
short, two weeks later, Khomeini returned home from exile in Paris, France, pushing the
revolution towards a theocratic-style of government. Initially, while some secular elements were
involved, they were quickly marginalized in the provisional government, leading the way for the
Islamic Republic of Iran. To add to the changes, on November 4, a band of students took over
the U.S. embassy, with tacit approval from the authorities, taking 52 hostages and punishing the
Carter administration for allowing the deposed Shah safe haven for cancer treatment. 118
In September of 1980, Saddam Hussein launched a war against Iran. Saddam new that he
needed to smash the new theocratic Iranian Republic or it would affect his ability to continue
ruling his Shiite-majority country with a Sunni elite. Given Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, Iraq also
posed a threat to Israel. Due to this, Iran seemed to be the lesser of two evils to Israel. This led
the U.S. to supply arms to Iraq while Israeli military strategists sought to secretly ship arms to
Iran. In July of 1981 an Argentinean cargo plane crashed en route to Iran. This crash later
revealed reports of a $200 million arms deal between Israel and Iran. 119 As alliances began to
shift, Israel would later regret sending weapons to Iran and eventually after the fall of Saddam,
Iran would become Israel’s greatest threat. 120
Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Iran increasingly yearned for a base in
the Arab world. It was finally able to assist in creating the militant, and later political, Hezbollah
movement in Lebanon.

Iran’s connection within Lebanon became the marginalized Shiite

population working against Israeli occupation. One year later, Hezbollah was reported to have
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planned and participated in a massive bombing that damaged the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing
over 60 people. Only six months later, a Hezbollah truck bomb struck a U.S. Marine barracks in
Beirut, killing 241 United States’ Marines. These actions were the precursors to the beginning of
modern day Hezbollah and what has become a formidable political and military force in the
region.
Following the death of the Ayatollah Khomenie in 1989, Iran’s religious elite began to
pursue a different path in terms of the country’s foreign policy. The previous few years had been
very volatile and they looked for a more practical and less aggressive foreign policy. The
leadership began to limit its support of Islamic movements. For example, the religious clerics
adopted a hands-off approach to the Chechen movement for independence from Russia. They
also did the same when Azerbaijan fell into conflict as well. They realized that they could not
alienate their Russian neighbors or those from smaller republics with whom they relied on
politically, economically and otherwise.
One area of the world they have not chosen to ignore is Israel. Since Hezbollah’s
founding, much support has been offered by the religious clerics in Iran. These same clerics
have asked their congregations to donate money to their networks so that they can funnel it to
clerics in Lebanon and continue supporting Hezbollah. This support has led to the rapid growth
of Hezbollah and allowed them the ability to continue their resistance efforts in Lebanon. 121
Though Hezbollah disliked interference from the United States, it disliked the Soviet
Union even more.

A cleansing took place in 1984 and 1985 that eliminated hundreds of

members that overtly supported communist ideology. At the time, the view was that at least the
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United States believed in God; moreover it accepted Islam as a religion. On the other hand, the
Soviet Union had repressed any belief in God since the Communists came to power. The Soviet
Union was viewed to be more dangerous than the United States. 122
From the European side, the French were also viewed with disdain as they chose to
support the Maronite Christian community from Lebanon’s inception. This was done so that
France could obtain a foothold in the region and drive a wedge between the inhabitants of
Lebanon. Even more troubling then French support for the Maronite community in Lebanon, the
French were selling arms to Iraq. Iraq was the sworn enemy of Iran, defending the Arab
frontline from Persian hordes and even more importantly, Iran was a close aide to Hezbollah.
This relegated France as an enemy of Hezbollah as well.
Historically, the crusades involved the clash of two different political worlds, the
Christian West and the Islamic East. In the East, the crusade to liberate Jerusalem from the
infidels, assisted in merging the Muslim world and causing it to coordinate army competencies
and devote resources in military services, which left it stronger and even more forceful to the
West. 123

In the case of Hezbollah, the group was not interested in looking East, nor West.

Hezbollah wanted to craft their own blend of ideology in the region and strengthen the Muslim
world wherever they could. In the Hezbollah worldview, compromising with the enemy is not a
possibility. The disintegration of the Islamic and Arab world after the fall of the Ottoman
Empire was the perceived effect of imperialism; in Hezbollah’s outlook, the whole structure
required a rethink. In practical terms, Hezbollah viewed itself as a power, resisting not only
Israel but the super powers of the world as well. 124
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Hezbollah’s main goal after its inception was the removal of Israel as it existed, not its
destruction. Hezbollah wanted to return Israel to a Muslim, Arab-dominated society where
European Jews are welcomed to live as they have been for thousands of years. What Hezbollah
cannot accept is the current status quo, a European satellite state run by European Jews in
Southwest Asia. Opposite the fact that a large portion of the Western World views Israel’s
existence as a permanent one in the region, the majority of those in the region, especially those
following Hezbollah’s ideology, would argue that it is not the case. Among Hezbollah’s goals is
the unification of the Shiite masses in the region as well as those that would agree with its
ideology. This reasoning provides a strong reasoning for Hezbollah’s wide support base among
the Christian and Sunni Muslim communities within Lebanon and throughout the region.
In Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah’s popularity is unmatched and it is still not uncommon
to see a family of 10 children or more wanting to assist or join Hezbollah. Socially speaking, the
majority of Hezbollah members are not living in the swanky downtown districts of Sunni
Muslim-dominated Beirut, but rather, in the slums of South Lebanon. The unification of such a
community has provided them with an opening to build up their support in Lebanon and in
resisting further Israeli efforts in the region.

The organization has almost always been

comprised of learned clerics or alims styled after the Iranian revolution and Shiite youth. The
external support base of Sunni Muslims and Arab and non Arab Christians has enabled the group
to have many friends to turn to in times of peace as well as crises.
The women of Hezbollah are also a critical element in that they are entrusted with taking
care of the wounded, grooming intellectuals, fathering future fighters, lawyers among others for
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the movement and learning how to fight, should it become a necessity. These women are
considered the backbone of Hezbollah activities, as the organization knows that without the
support of the mothers, sisters and wives of the community, they can have no future in Lebanon.
Children on the other hand, play no role in Hezbollah’s activities. 125

The Hawala System

Hezbollah has been well-funded by Iran and Syria as well as other groups and individuals
for many years. The bulk of this support is known to come from Iran. While it is generally
known where the money flows from, it is particularly interesting to see how the money is
received. A form of Islamic economics is at play and exists in approximately forty-five Muslim
countries as well as a number of other countries throughout the world, a banking system parallel
to that of the secular banking system, where depositors expect a certain amount of interest on
their investment. 126 This parallel system plays a central role in funding for Hezbollah. One of
the main pipelines that serve to provide funds to Hezbollah is the Hawala system
A financial system that has gone through scrutiny since the events of September 11, 2001
is known as Hawala. Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists and
operates outside of or parallel to 'traditional' banking or financial channels. It was developed in
India before the introduction of Western banking practices and is currently a major remittance
system used around the world. 127

In the U.S., it is known as the Informal Funds Banking

System (IFTS). In the Islamic world, Hawala is known by different names but performs the
same function. In the majority of Muslim countries, it is referred to as Hawala, in Arabic this
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refers to “someone who transfers.” 128 For example, in Bangladesh it is known as Hundi, Padala
in the Philippines, in Thailand as Foe Kuan and in China as Fei Chien, Feiqian or “money that
flies.” 129
The key element that the Hawala system depends on to work properly is that it must rely
on trust. In terms of ease, it is much less expensive than using a bank or any financial institution.
It works very simply and is akin to a Western Union service. For example, if an organization or
an individual wanted to send funds to Hezbollah, they would provide the monies to a trusted
person and ask them to deliver the funds to someone else. Its simplicity is what makes it so
difficult to eliminate. In return, you or someone you know will do the same for another party
and they will receive a commission or favor in return. As long as all parties have trust, the
money will be delivered and no official exchange will be known of in the financial system. In
these communities, it is very harmful if one were not to come through on a promise to provide a
Hawala service. This system is also based on regional and familial relationships, making it very
difficult and dishonorable if one were to fail on their promise, specifically if the funds are meant
for Hezbollah. 130
The primary reasons for using this type of service are: cost effectiveness, efficiency,
reliability and other various understandings. First, cost effectiveness, where a number of factors
come into play such as closer exchange rates and lower overhead among others. Second, the
Hawala system is very efficient, it takes at most, one to two days and holidays, or weekends; any
time distractions are limited. Third, reliability, when dealing with international transactions;
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banks require extensive information and the money is sent from one bank to another until
reaching its final destination which can sometimes lead to interruptions.
Another reason is a lack of bureaucracy. You are not required to have documentation,
receipts or personal information of any kind. A lack of paperwork is an additional reason. No
paperwork is required to send the money and this means it cannot be tracked to any one person
very easily. Finally, tax evasion, while the Hawala system is not made for individuals to evade
paying taxes to their respective governments, there are many simple and high tech methods
involving Hawala that allow individuals to limit the amount of taxes that they do pay. 131
This time honored tradition has received negative attention in the media because
criminals have used this tool to transfer funds around the world by using individuals that do not
know the real purposes behind their Hawala. On the other hand, this system has existed for
hundreds of years and millions of people use it around the world for good and with positive
results. 132 In the case of Hezbollah, Hawala entails an “Mhawel,” pronounced m-howel, in one
country and another Mhawel in another country. Through this system, money never moves out
of the country. The Mhawel, located in country A simply places a phone call or faxes in the
money transaction to a known Mhawel in country B. Party B provides the funds for the end
result. 133 Iran provides Hezbollah funds through a number of methods. Money can be sent in a
variety of forms including: invoice manipulation, trade diversion, illegal use of online gifts cards
as well as a number of schemes concocted to send funds to Hezbollah. 134
One main issue is that both Mhawels must have the financial resources in order to be able
to provide the funds transfer to the proposed recipient. In Iran’s case, the method of choice is
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simply sending someone across the border with millions in cash. For example, on occasion,
individuals are caught with large quantities of cash attempting to cross the border into Lebanon.

U.S Fundraising Efforts

Hezbollah’s actions in the United States have been mostly restricted to fundraising. An
example of this was shown in March 2005; Mahmoud Youssef Kourani, a Lebanese citizen
living in a Detroit suburb was sentenced to 4 and a half years in prison for conspiracy to raise
money for Hezbollah. Kourani admitted to having meetings at his home for donations to
Hezbollah. According to the indictment unsealed by a federal grand jury in Michigan in January
2004, Kourani was a "member, fighter, recruiter and fund-raiser for Hezbollah." 135
A second instance of Hezbollah activity in the United States was exposed when two
Charlotte, North Carolina brothers, Mohammad and Chawki Hammoud, were apprehended
providing material support to Hezbollah through a cigarette smuggling ring that deliberately
aimed at funding terrorist organizations. The two brothers were part of a larger network in North
America responsible for raising money and procuring dual-use technologies for Hezbollah.
Items were purchased in both Canada and the United States, including goggles, naval equipment,
global positioning systems, stun guns, nitrogen cutters and laser range finders. 136 In the United
States, law enforcement agencies are investigating a number of criminal enterprises alleged to be
funding Middle East terrorist groups including the stealing and reselling of baby formula, scams
involving grocery coupons, food stamp fraud, welfare claims, credit cards and even unlicensed
T-Shirts.138
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A major sting operation conducted against Hezbollah in the U.S., code-named Operation
Smokescreen took place beginning in 1995. The operation involved the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Sheriff's Office in Iredell County, North Carolina, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the United States Department of State's Diplomatic Security
Service (DSS) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATF).
Operation Smokescreen ended the fundraising operation and resulted in the arrest of a number of
members of the Hezbollah cell in the U.S.
The case brought against the North Carolina cell included "copyright violations,
counterfeit violations, bank scams, identity theft, credit card fraud, tax evasion, and money
laundering, among other charges filed.” 137 Charges also included "material support to a terrorist
organization. Federal courts estimated the cell collected a total of $8 million, funneled through
some 500 various bank accounts leading to a large profit. With these funds, the Hezbollah cell
were able to purchase and ship "surveying equipment, Global Positioning Systems, night vision
goggles and scopes, metal detection equipment, aircraft analysis and design software, military
compasses, video equipment, binoculars, naval equipment, ultrasonic dog repellers, laser range
finders, zoom lenses, computer equipment (laptops, high-speed modems; processors, joysticks,
plotters, scanners, and printers), digital cameras, stun guns, handheld radios and receivers,
cellular telephones, mining, drilling and blasting equipment," and nitrogen cutters to Hezbollah
operatives in Southwest Asia.
The cell's leader, Mohammad Hammoud was sentenced to 155 years in federal prison.
Hammoud's older brother, Shawqi Youssef, was also charged and received a prison sentence of
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70 years. 138 Similar cases were later uncovered in Asheville, North Carolina, and Louisville,
Kentucky. The operation led to the creation of the North Carolina Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF).
In a separate but highly significant event, in September 2002, an Israeli military court
indicted a Lieutenant Colonel in the Israeli army, part of a ten-member gang, of spying for
Hezbollah. The officer, who purportedly lost part of his eyesight fighting Hezbollah guerillas,
passed top secret information to Hezbollah operatives in return for cash, heroin and hashish.139
Hezbollah is also alleged to have fundraising operations from the drug and diamond trades in
various parts of the Middle East, South America and West Africa.

Hezbollah Goals

Independent communication has been a major goal for Hezbollah. It is important enough
that Hezbollah controls its own parallel communication network from the Beirut International
airport.

Since its initiation, Hezbollah has spent large sums pushing its world view through a

number of outlets. The group’s weekly newspaper, Al-Ahed (The Pledge), was launched on June
13, 1984, and was followed by the weeklies Al Bilad, Al Wahda, El Ismailya, and the monthly Al
Sabil.140 Hezbollah’s radio station, Al-Nour (the Light), was founded during Hezballah’s conflict
with Amal, another Shiite group vying for support in 1988, when a group of young Hezbollah
fighters spontaneously began broadcasting news of the clashes.
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Hezballah’s Internet presence first came into effect in 1996. The Central internet site
(Hizbollah.org), is the group’s official homepage, and is available in both English and Arabic. 139
Hezbollah also maintains three other major websites, all of which are in Arabic and English:
http://www.nasrollah.net, the official homepage of the group’s leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah,
http://www.moqawama.net, known as the “Islamic Resistance Support Association,” and which
describes the group’s attacks on Israeli targets; and http://www.manartv.com.lb, an information
site that is the homepage of al-Manar Television channel. 140

Live footage of Hezbollah’s

operations appeared through the Hezbollah television station, al-Manar, for the first time in 1986
with coverage of the invasion of the Israeli-occupied Sujud. 141 These stations have been able to
transmit photos of dead and wounded Israeli soldiers deep within Israeli territory, creating ripple
effects within Israeli society.
According to Hezbollah’s deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem, the camera became an
essential element in all resistance operations after the first operation was broadcast.

The

establishment of al-Manar followed shortly thereafter; its first broadcast was Ayatollah
Khomeini’s funeral in June 1989. 142 Hezbollah also receives and spends funds on humanitarian
and construction causes in Lebanon. Hezbollah understands that it has been able to legitimize its
organization through humanitarian assistance which will lead to more favorable political
support. 143
Hezbollah has also learned how to deal with large-scale relief efforts such as:
construction equipment, building material and plenty of manpower. While waiting for
international aid to arrive during the last conflict, Hezbollah was able to finish much of the work
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needed beforehand. For example, the television station al-Manar reported that hundreds of prefabricated houses were already being delivered around Tyre, Lebanon just after the war. 144
Moreover, single payments of up to $12,000 have been given to those who can show that their
homes were destroyed during the conflict with new U.S. currency. 145
In an effort to parlay Hezbollah’s psychological operation well beyond television stations
and health clinics, Hezbollah has recently built its first theme park in Lebanon. Visiting the
“Tourist Landmark of Resistance,” a tour guide will welcome you emphasizing the fact that
Hezbollah is the sole defender of Lebanon against Israel. 146 Hezbollah also emphasizes that their
involvement in Southern Lebanon is a defensive one. This park serves as part of Hezbollah’s
successful psy-ops machine against Israel and those that regard it as a terrorist group. Visitors
are led past a large opening filled with Israeli helmets, shell casings and tanks. 147

Other park

features include panels with details of the Israeli military machine as well as a map showing
places in Israel such as the Negev Nuclear Research Center near Dimona. Children can pretend
to aim anti-aircraft guns or jump on overturned armored personnel carriers. 148
Among other attractions at the park is a Hezbollah bunker used during the 2006 war,
offering visitors a view into the life of Hezbollah fighters. Finally, there is a park called Martyrs
Hill, featuring a garden decorated with guns and missiles. It is reported that MIT Professor,
Noam Chomsky as well as other dignitaries attended the grand opening and up to three hundredthousand people visited the theme park in the first ten weeks of its opening. 149

This park site

once served as an important base for Hezbollah fighters and serves as an important reminder of
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Israel’s force in the region. It is purported that Hezbollah has plans to expand the park's appeal
by adding swimming areas, playgrounds, a number of hotels and camping facilities. 150
While Hezbollah has learned that the youth are the future of the movement, they have not
stopped at theme parks; Iran’s patronage has provided them with funds to go even further. In
order to popularize Hezbollah among the youth of the region, Hezbollah created a popular video
game in 2003, known as “Special Force”. Created similarly to a number of U.S. styled games
such as “Delta Force” and “Counter Strike,” where Arabs are often characterized as the “bad
guys;” Hezbollah has produced this game with Israel portrayed as the enemy. 151

The original

version’s popularity sparked considerable attention and lead to a second version in 2007 based
off of the 2006 war with Israel.

Hezbollah: The New Strategy

During the initial stages, Hezbollah began to take part in suicide bombings and the
kidnapping of journalists, reporters and others. Hezbollah also planned and succeeded in the
suicide attacks on the American Embassy in Beirut and a U.S. Marine barracks in 1983. 152 The
weapons provided to Hezbollah to commit such attacks have historically gone through Syria.
For example, on December 26, 2003, an earthquake leveled much of the city of Bam, in
Southeastern Iran, killing thousands. Transport planes carrying necessary aid poured in from all
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over, including Syria. According to intelligence reports from Israel, certain planes returned to
Syria carrying weapons, including long-range Zelzal missiles. 153

In part, Iran’s influence has assisted Hezbollah to go from a small scale resistance
organization to a well organized group with political power. For example, lacking Iranian
assistance, Hezbollah would not have been able to carry out the attacks directed at Jewish targets
in Buenos Aires, retaliatory attacks, argued to have been carried out at soft targets because
Hezbollah was unable to strike directly at Israel at the time. In 1992, a suicide bomber attacked
the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 and injuring more than 200 civilians 154 In 1994,
a truck bomb destroyed the Jewish community center killing 85 and injuring over 100 civilians.
Argentine prosecutors later held Iran responsible for ordering the attack and Hezbollah for
carrying it out.

Also, it is argued that an attack so far from Lebanon could not be carried out by
Hezbollah alone. It would need the help of a state actor to obtain weapons and logistical
information. Some have even gone so far as to say it was planned and carried out by Iran with
the help of Hezbollah operatives. Syria and Iran also provide satellite communications and
infantry weapons, including Semtex plastic explosives, modern Russian-made antitank weapons,
and the training required to use them. 155 Russian-made antitank missiles have damaged or
destroyed Israeli vehicles, including the Merkava, with a 20 percent success rate. 156 Hezbollah
fighters routinely use tunnels to emerge from underground locations to fire shoulder-held
antitank missiles. These fighters range from a regular army of 2,000 to 4,000, often aided by a
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larger circle of irregulars who provide logistics and weapons storage in houses and civilian
buildings. 157

Hezbollah revolutionary forces maintain locations within civilian areas making it difficult
to fight without Israel having to occupy or bomb civilian areas. On orders, fighters emerge to
use launchers and fire missiles before returning to underground bunkers. The guerilla numbers
are relatively small compared to the size of the Israeli Army. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard
has assisted Hezbollah with special units for intelligence, antitank warfare, engineering,
communications, explosives and rocket launching. The guard has also taught Hezbollah how to
make “improvised explosive devices as well as how to aim rockets,” and according to the
Israelis, they were also taught how to fire the C-802 ground-to-ship missile. 158

According to intelligence officers in Washington D.C, Iranian officers have made
multiple trips to Lebanon to train Hezbollah fighters to aim and fire medium-range missiles, such
as the Fajr-5. 159 Hezbollah has also obtained antitank weapons from Russia. 160 One of these
weapons is the dual usage RPG-29, an antitank weapon and an anti-personnel round. This
weapon is of high concern for Israel because it is dangerous for the Israeli made Merkava tank.

Despite the fact that large Arab armies have been defeated repeatedly, Hezbollah, with
Iranian help has been able to eliminate the myth that the Israeli army is unbeatable. Hezbollah is
much better equipped with sophisticated weaponry and its soldiers are well trained to fight a
standing army. They have also been trained to be patient and attuned to gathering intelligence,
learning guerrilla warfare yet remaining respectful of Israeli firepower and mobility. 161
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New Leadership

Hezbollah’s success can be related to a number of factors coming from purely domestic
politics while others from a longer-term strategic importance. Hezbollah has understood that it
cannot rely on military victories alone. 162 To correct this, a major change occurred in 1992,
when Sheik Hassan Nasrallah took the helm of the organization and turned it into a system with
three regional commands, each with its own military autonomy. Hezbollah set up separate and
autonomous units that live among civilians with local reserve forces.

To mix in with the local population, Hezbollah commanders travel in unmarked vehicles
without bodyguards and wear no obvious markings to differentiate them from the locals.
Hezbollah began its tactics by setting up roadside bombs detonated by cables, which the Israelis
learned to defeat with wire-cutting attachments added to their vehicles. Hezbollah then upgraded
and began later using radio detonators, then were pushed to use cell phone detonators, then a
double system of cell phones, and then a photocell detonator much like that used to open garage
doors. More recently, Hezbollah has begun using pressure detonators dug into roads causing
havoc on Israeli vehicles. Hezbollah bunkers have gone from holes in the grounds to concrete
storerooms with ladders, emergency openings, escape routes and sophisticated technology. 163

Certain authors have pushed the idea that Hezbollah is little more than an extremist group
with fundamentalist ideals. In agreement with this range of arguments, Podhoretz argues that
there is no misunderstanding. The Islamofacists, referring to Hezbollah, are not just out to
murder as many Americans as possible, they are also dedicated to the obliteration of the
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freedoms and principles that America is based upon. 164 When looked into on a less superficial
level, Hezbollah argues that it does not want any foreign intervention in any part of Lebanon and
it is willing to fight for this, politically and otherwise.

On the other end of the argument, Southern notes: “Before 1100, I have found only one
mention of the name Mahomet in medieval literature outside Spain and Southern Italy. But from
the year 1120 every one in the West had some picture of what Islam meant, and who Mahomet
was. The picture was brilliantly clear, but it was not knowledge…. Its authors luxuriated in
ignorance of triumphant imagination.” 165

This provides a basic example of the

misunderstandings related to a better comprehension of Hezbollah and the ability to understand
and negotiate with them.

Changing Alliances

A previous article explaining the then upcoming parliamentary election in June regarding
the main Armenian political party in Lebanon explains the new political realities in Lebanon
perfectly.

The vote of the 150,000-strong Armenian community was looking to sway the

outcome of the bitter race between the pro-Western government and the opposition led by
Hezbollah. All of the major parties are fighting for votes but some have already made up their
minds. Out of the three Armenian parties, Tashnak enjoys the most support and it has already
made its choice, joining the Hezbollah-led alliance. 166
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Voting for the opposition is also an unusual phenomenon for the Armenian community,
which has traditionally voted for the government. Like all of Lebanon’s confessional political
system, the Armenian community has an assigned number of seats in parliament. For many
years, these seven seats have always been won by the Tashnak Party.

This changed in 2000

when a newly backed Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri redrew the electoral map of Beirut, dividing
the Armenian neighborhoods and placing them in districts with Sunni Muslim majorities. The
law change resulted in the Tashnak party losing seats to lesser-known Armenians who supported
the Sunni Muslim prime minister.
Since Tashnak was campaigning under the opposition umbrella, winning seats for
themselves would mean helping Hezbollah to win as well.

Many of those in the Christian

constituency argue that they have much in common with the Muslim Shiite movement.

The

ethnic Armenians living in Lebanon are also against oppression, they dealt with oppression
during the fall of the Ottoman Empire when they were forced to leave.

The Armenian

community in Lebanon has been generally hesitant about the change in the political arena but
understand that it needs to continue its role as a voting force in Lebanon. Hezbollah has been
able to keep stability in their region and protects the Christian community as well; they
remember this when voting. Were it not for Hezbollah, the Israeli’s would have remained in
Lebanon for far longer than they did. 167 The Christians in this community fully understand this
fact.
The local constituents of Hezbollah disagree with the U.S. and the other states that have
declared Hezbollah a terrorist organization. While the U.S. has generally declared Hezbollah a
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terrorist organization along the line of al-Qaeda, many would argue that does not take into
account, the schools, hospitals and other functions that Hezbollah provides for the poor of
Lebanon that have been forgotten by the government in Beirut.

Remarks

Hezbollah was created as a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Future
Israeli bombardments, along with American boots in Lebanon, have caused Hezbollah to harden
its grasp on a few towns in the south of Lebanon with a bunch of ragtag 20 something recruits.
Currently, Hezbollah, along with the buildup of its military arsenal, has managed to develop into
a relevant force with television, radio stations, newspapers, and a number of seats in the
Lebanese parliament.

As a result of its defensive territorial acquisition, Hezbollah has become an influential
non-state actor in the region and enjoys much more independent activity than in the past. Syria,
which once had an important say in the activities of the organization, has been marginalized and
the government is currently fighting for its life with violent crackdowns against a mix of what
seems to be peaceful protesters and religious antagonists. Current events seem to show that Iran
is now much more in control. 168
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CHAPTER IV: SYRIA
Introduction

For better or worse, stability in modern-day Syria began in the 1970s through an internal
coup that brought the military to the forefront of power. Hafez al-Assad, an Air Force pilot by
training, managed to uproot the historical political base in Syria and create an authoritarian
regime based on two pillars. These two pillars consisted of party strength and above all, military
strength. By placing a number of his associates in power positions, he began to change the face
of a historically Sunni Muslim dominated power structure in Syria. Further complicating the
issue was Syria’s ethnic makeup.
Kasmieh argues that Syria’s Socio-religious cultural fragmentation made it quite
challenging. Syria is made up of religious and ethnic communities ranging from the Ismailis to
Alawi sects, Sunnis, Greek Orthodox Christians, Druze and a small Jewish population. 169 In
order for Assad to maintain control, he used his pan Arab, nationalist platform to unite the
minorities in backing his power base. In terms of ethnicities, Arabs make up only a portion of
Syrian population, Carcassians, Assyrians, Kurds, Armenians, Turkoman, and a sizeable
Palestinian-Arab population are all part of the Syrian makeup. 170 This made it all the more
difficult for the Assad regime to maintain control without stirring the fires of division within the
country.
Hafez al Assad was able to unite the country under his firm grip and in terms of
unification of government, create a Syrian renaissance that would last numerous American
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presidents and many wars with the State of Israel. For example, the 1973 Egyptian-Syrian
offensive came as a shock to the Israelis because cohesion of the Syrian government apparatus
had obviously changed. Chomsky states that Syria’s newfound cohesion was proven in the 1973
offensive against Israel. Government and military apparatuses were acting in unison without the
usual disagreements that had besieged the Syrian government for so many years. 171 The most
serious threat to the stability of the then Syrian government was not Israel, but the Muslim
brotherhood.
The most serious threat to the Baath or renaissance party came from religious
fundamentalism. The Muslim Brotherhood was a threat to the governments of virtually all Arab
states and was a direct threat to the Syrian government as it had a major stronghold in the town
of Hama.

The brotherhood committed militant attacks against the government in urban

populated centers throughout Syria. Interestingly, the movement failed to take root outside
urban areas and among the majority of Sunni Muslims. While the government had acted with
force in retaliation for attacks in the past, the turning point came in 1982. Following an attack in
the city of Hama where a number of Alawite cadets were killed, the army used brute force to
quell the movement.
After a night of fighting, regular army units were sent into Hama with a demand of
general surrender for the entire city. Those who did not surrender were killed. The military
units were ordered to follow a “scorched earth” policy where everything that could be useful to
the enemy was destroyed. 172 Subsequently, thousands of civilians were killed with estimates
ranging from 10,000 to 40,000. Until the recent protests of the Arab Spring, anti government
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religious movements in Syria have been few and far between. It is almost impossible to mention
Syria without mentioning Lebanon. Although Syria and parts of Lebanon have never accepted
the disintegration of greater Syria, Hafez al-Assad wanted to create a weak and compliant
Lebanon dependent on Syria for a number of its political, economic and military needs.
Israel’s military and political strategy on the other hand, was to attempt to insulate
Lebanon from the Arab-Israeli conflict through a separate peace treaty with the Gemayel
government as had been done with Egypt many years ago under the leadership of Sadat. The
Lebanese civil war necessitated Syrian involvement in Lebanon and intervention amongst the
PLO factions as well as buffering Israeli interests. Concurrently, American forces were stationed
in Lebanon in a bid to counter Syrian efforts in the country. For better or for worse, U.S.
political will to remain in Lebanon was not strong enough after two bombings against American
targets killed scores of American soldiers. These events led to the Taif Accord which created
stability in Lebanon, a cold temporary peace with Israel, and stopped the radicalization of
Lebanon by Palestinian fighters.
During this time, President Assad’s son Basel was being groomed to take power.
However, he was killed in a car accident in 1994, forcing President Hafez al-Assad to recall his
younger son Bashar, an ophthalmologist living in the United Kingdom. Bashar was trained in
the military and diplomatic core and within six short years, given the rank of colonel. Bashar
was introduced to the ruling elite and connected to his father’s backers. Bashar had taken on
many public roles as well as including a corruption campaign, among others. 173 Upon his
father’s death in 2000, Bashar had not yet been given the necessary post to assume leadership
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and was not old enough to take power. Despite these blocks, laws were changed and within a
mere forty-eight hours, he ascended to the presidency.
As the mourning period for his father came to an end, Bashar was elected president of the
Syrian Arab Republic with a vast majority of the vote, 97.29 percent. 174 Bashar would now have
to focus on the foreign policy left to him by his father, learning from the direct military
confrontations of 1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982 between Syria and Israel. His father had the
convenience of gravitating toward the Soviet Union for backing; now though, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics was no more and he would have to gravitate more towards regional
actors for support and to balance his strategic parity with Israel.
Because of this, many Syrians feel that they are in geographic competition with Israel for
Syria Proper and this would be a major component of Bashar’s leadership. 175 Leverrit has said
that by solidifying Syria’s role in the region after Hafez al-Assad’s death, Bashar al-Assad took
control of the power structure and has managed to create a very delicate impetus for change.
While juggling the issues of Lebanon, the Arab-Israeli conflict, relations with Washington, D.C,
and the regional balance, he has managed to continue the slow process of change without
upsetting the old guard. 176 Specifically, Bashar al-Assad’s foreign policy has differed somewhat
from that of his father, further allowing Syria to change with the necessity of an ever-changing
political atmosphere. 177 Long also states that Syria sees itself as the heart of the Arab world and
that by following the 2000 political succession from Hafiz al-Assad to President Bashar, Syrian
foreign policy continues to focus on the stand-off with Israel.
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In the mean time, Syria has warmed relations with many of its neighbors to shore up
support in case of any future dealings with its Israeli neighbor. 178 In 2004, problems again began
to erupt for the new Syrian President after the extension of the new Lebanese President, Emile
Lahood. A galvanization of ant-Syrian forces began to be heard in Lebanon with calls for Syria
to withdraw militarily to the Bekaa valley. Although Assad tried to improve his relations by
withdrawing troops from central Lebanon, a turn for the worst took place with the assassination
of former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik al-Hariri in Beirut. Despite attempts, Syria was
unable to bring about support to stay in Lebanon. 179
Notwithstanding widespread thinking that the new Assad would be able to get through
this impasse, the last Syrian troops exited from Lebanon in April of 2005, almost 30 years since
they were first requested to enter. In retrospect, even with the troop withdrawal, it is not
concluded that Syria is out of the picture in Lebanon, as many Lebanese still support Syria,
including the larger Shiite community and well as those in the Sunni and Christian communities.
Syrian Foreign Policy

The United States State Department lists Hezbollah as a major sponsor of terrorism. The
Montoneros in Argentina, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the recently defeated Tamil Tigers in Sri
Lanka are all groups which have attracted thousands of followers, despite their having been
responsible for many well-publicized militant operations. 180

Syria views such groups and

Hezbollah as a means of foreign policy. This explains the Israeli view that Syria’s relationship
to non-state actors, primarily Hezbollah, is a primary threat due to the location of Hezbollah
forces in Lebanon.
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Despite Iran’s initial activities backing Iran, Syria also played a very important role in the
expansion of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Without Syria being available as a passageway, it would
have been improbable that Hezbollah could be turned into an autonomous political, social and
military force within Lebanon. As mentioned previously, an Iranian military force was sent into
Lebanon via Syria after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

181

While the Iranians

participated in the training of Hezbollah, Hezbollah’s leadership managed to disseminate its
ideas within the Lebanese Shiite community. In turn, the Iranians benefited from their new
strategic alliance with Syria in Lebanon. While these factors point out the importance of Syria’s
role in allowing Iranian influence within Lebanon, it is this author’s opinion that the Israeli
invasion of 1982 not only created the impetus for but also served as a deciding factor the creation
of Hezbollah.
Syria uses Hezbollah as a deterrent not only against Israeli invasion but also as a balance
between those anti-Syrian Forces within Lebanon. Syria’s involvement with Hezbollah has been
a counter to Israel in the region. The Hezbollah card allows Syria some discretion in deterring a
full scale Israeli invasion as well. Syria’s support for Hezbollah, other than ideological, has been
through the build-up of arms in the region and pushing for a closer weapons balance. 182 In terms
of ideology, when the United States created its military buildup for an attack on Iraq, Syria
rejected the United States condemnation of terrorism without distinguishing between Liberation
movements and al-Qaeda. 183 Assad has hoped that his defiance of Washington, D.C would
strengthen him at home and once a new administration came in, the United States would soften
its policy towards Syria. 184 This turned out to be true under the Obama administration but the
Arab spring would bring problems of its own.
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It is said that politics makes strange bedfellows. The Syrian-Iranian relationship is a
peculiar relation at best. Despite Syria’s secularist views and Iran’s religious theocracy, the two
have managed to maintain relations in a very positive manner. Beginning with Syria’s support of
Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, Syria began supporting Iran against neighboring Arab states. Since that
time, Syria’s relationship with Iran has solidified and is considered one of the most solid in the
region not only politically, but economically as well. During the 1980s, as the jointly backed
Hezbollah organization began taking shape, both Syria and Iran found themselves even more
connected in their foreign policy goals. Hezbollah is viewed to be the crux of that relationship.
Furthermore, Iran and Syria have signed a mutual defense agreement agreeing to defend each
other in case of an attack by Israel or the United States. 185
While Hezbollah defers to Syrian influence in Lebanon, their interests do not always
overlap. Hezbollah has and will continue to take Syria’s interests into consideration, although it
only does so unless it jeopardizes its political support in Lebanon. 186 This in itself implies limits
on Syria’s influence. Hezbollah leaders also understand that Syria’s use for Hezbollah is very
utilitarian and they are both aware that alliances of this nature may eventually become
inconvenient for one party or the other.
Syria has carefully considered its options and has learned from the 2006 HezbollahIsraeli conflict and has adapted its military strategy accordingly. Syria has also long used
Hezbollah as a form of asymmetric warfare against Israel. As discussed earlier, Lebanon became
a center of proxy war against Israel and the end result of this was the creation of Hezbollah.187
As Israel was forced to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000 due to pressure from Hezbollah, Syria
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was also forced to withdraw from Lebanon in 2005 as a result of its perceived involvement in the
assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafik al Hariri. Neither of the withdrawals, though,
put an end to competition for power in Lebanon.

As mentioned earlier, during the 2006

Hezbollah-Israeli war, Israel pounded Lebanese sites, attempting to force the population to
pressure the Lebanese government to restrain Hezbollah forces. Hezbollah was able to withstand
Israeli forces and continued to fight back. 188
As Syria and Israel have competed for outside support, Israel has long received the
support of the United States. This support has included massive amounts of financial aid and
military support. On the Syrian side, Syria has received support from Iran. It can be argued that
by understanding the relationship between the United States and Israel, Syria understood that it
would never be able to receive the same type of support from Iran due to the strength of the
relationship as well as the technological limitations in comparison to the United States.
Therefore, Syria needs to augment its ability and create its own support network with the
creation of Hezbollah. While the Soviet Union existed, Syria was able to replenish its weapons
in a relatively short period of time. After the fall of its Russian predecessor, the situation
changed completely. 189

The Next Hezbollah-Israeli Conflict?

Syria has also continued to exploit Israeli fears with the asymmetric threat posed by
Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon and against Israeli sites throughout the world. During the 2006
74

Hezbollah-Israeli war, Hezbollah proved that it could withstand a heavy bombardment from
Israeli forces and Syria proved that it could conduct a war by proxy without invoking a heavyhanded response from Israeli forces onto its territory. 190 The chance of another war between
Israel and Hezbollah is unknown but highly likely. Israel is unlikely to allow Hezbollah to
continue building up its arsenal without some type of targeted strike or massive invasion. It
cannot allow an enemy to grow so close to its northern border, especially since Egypt can no
longer be guaranteed to cover the Southern flank of Israel, and Jordan has to walk a thin line
with its citizenry engaging in massive protests on a semi-regular basis. Israel has realized that it
must also be better equipped to fight and execute wars in an asymmetrical context.
It is also well known that any future war will include a list of the newest weaponry
Hezbollah will have been resupplied with from Iran, coming in through Syria. Syria has not only
assisted Hezbollah in re-arming with more sophisticated weaponry, it has also assisted in
incorporating techniques learned from the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war. A senior Hezbollah
official was quoted in Defense News regarding Hezbollah’s new activities, saying “we have
subjected our guerillas to training and acquired needed weapons systems and developed new
tactics to fight a more determined Israeli enemy… We also have as good tactical missiles as we
did last time… with some additional surprises.” 191
There have also been reports that Iran has transferred a number of missiles to Syrian
territory in case of an Israeli attack. These missiles in turn could be transferred to Hezbollah and
used to strike virtually anywhere within Israeli territory. Weapons such as the medium range
Shahab 3, the Russian made Scud C as well as the Scud B missiles. Theses scud missiles bring
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to light a very important issue. If Hezbollah has been armed with them, it can seriously change
the balance between Hezbollah and Israel.

Weapons

Scud missiles were originally created by the Soviet Union based off of the German V2
rocket design manufactured by the Nazis during the remaining days of Nazi Germany. The
Soviets were able to simplify the engines of the missiles, making the missile much more efficient
for battle. In the mid 1980s Iran acquired a number of Scud missiles from North Korea. Similar
missiles had been acquired by North Korea from Egypt in the early 1980s.

The Koreans had

learned to manufacture their own versions of the Scud missiles, known as the Hwasong-5 and
Hwasong-6 and were exporting them to Iran and Syria. In Iran, these missiles are known as the
Shahab-1, the Shahab-2 and the Shahab-3. 192 Currently, both Iran and Syria are believed to be
manufacturing their own versions of Scud missiles. Although their accuracy is questionable,
they can cause damage and produce large amounts of fear among troops and civilians. The range
is roughly 500 kilometers at best and the accuracy is very limited.
As mentioned earlier, it has been reported that Syria has passed Scud missiles to
Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon. These reports, if true, can truly tilt the balance in the region.
On December 5, 1989, Iraq launched a 25 meter-long rocket with the intention of being able to
put a satellite into space. This “Scud” missile was actually five Iraqi-version Scuds bundled
together. 193 The vehicle had a SCUD-based liquid propulsion system consisting of four or five
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bundled and modified SCUD missiles.

The second stage also consisted of a SCUD missile,

while the third stage had an SA-2 motor.
Only the first stage was able to function, and it is possible that the second and third stages
were not operational and this launce was merely an initial test. The system was called al-Abid,
and was meant as a test to see if this type of missile launch would be successful in putting
satellites into orbit. These satellites could be used for reconnaissance as well as communication
and control in low orbit.
The mere implication for Hezbollah with this type of missile technology in its hands
shows how far Syria is willing to go to support Hezbollah and counter Israeli hegemony in the
region. Israel’s main concern regarding the missiles transferred by Syria to Hezbollah focuses
on the M600 missile. This missile, a clone of Iran’s Fateh-110, is manufactured in Syria,
extremely accurate and has a range of 250 kilometers and can carry a 500-kilogram warhead. 194
If the reports are true that Hezbollah has indeed received Scud missiles and if these missiles are
placed in Southern Lebanon, they would be able to strike any city within Israel, drastically
changing the balance in the region and creating a high level of risk for Israel when and how it
chooses to deal with Hezbollah.

Syrian Regime and 2011 Protests

The protest movement begun by Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia, on December 17, 2010
created a wave of protests throughout the Arab world, ending first with the departure of Zein alDin Ben Ali, the former dictator of Tunisia. The second stop of this protest movement came to
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Egypt and lasted less than one month. This movement was successful in bringing down the long
held reign of Egypt’s dictator Mohammad Gamal Mubarak.

As the movement spread to

practically all parts of the Arab world, it slowly came to Syria after repeated calls from the
Syrian government that it was immune to protest movements sweeping the region for a number
of reasons, one of which is the anti-Zionist and or anti-Israel foreign policy it holds. The regime
has a history of promoting itself as the bulwark against Israeli hegemony in the region. At first,
these speeches seemed to work but slowly the protests in Syria began to take shape.
While the protests were modest in the beginning, January 26 proved to be a turning point.
Hasan Ali Akleh, an Arab from the Syrian town of Al-Hasakah, committed the act of selfimmolation, just as had been done in Tunisia to protest the actions of the Syrian regime. Merely
48 hours later, demonstrations began to spread to other Syrian towns including AlRaggah. 195
Initially, wider calls for protests on social media sites, such as Facebook attracted wide attention
by Arabs from outside of Syria though internally, there was little activity. On February 5, a few
hundred demonstrators in al-Hasakah, participated in calling for the removal of the regime. This
protest was quickly subdued with dozens of protesters being arrested. 196 By mid March, the
protest became more frequent with multiple demonstrations taking place across multiple Syrian
cities. The protests grew from hundreds to thousands in, Deir ez-Zor, Daraa, al-Hasakah, and
Hama, the site of the 1982 Hama massacre where Syrian journalist Subhi Hadidi has written that
soldiers killed “30,000 or 40,000 of the city's citizens and expelled 100,000 and in addition,
15,000 missing whose bodies were never found.” 197
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After online calls for a Friday protest, thousands of protesters demanding an end to
government corruption began protesting in cities across Syria. The protesters were quickly met
with a violent crackdown by state security forces, known as the Mukhabarat. Many were beaten
while others were arrested and sent to jails. The city of Daraa in Southern Syria, near the
Jordanian border, became the focal point of protests.
Many government and Assad family-related buildings were torched including the Ba'ath
party headquarters in Daraa, the courthouse, and Syriatel headquarters owned by Rami
Makhloof, the infamous cousin of Bashar al-Assad. Within 24 hours, protests began in Banyas,
Jassem, Homs and Hama. 198

The government began to cut off phone services and began

holding journalists in the country, as well as limiting access to cities by setting up checkpoints in
the streets. By March 25, tens of thousands of protesters were taking to the streets around the
country, including some in Aleppo and Damascus, Syria’s second and largest cities, respectively.
Troops began opening fire on unarmed protestors according to many news reports.

Over

100,000 protesters in Daraa drew a fierce reaction from the government. 199
Reports suggest that over 20 protesters were killed initially. 200 There were reports that at
least 20 people were killed in protests in Daraa, which drew over 100,000 people. Acts of
violence against the regime began to occur such as the knocking down of a Hafez al-Assad statue
and a governor's home was set on fire. 201 Many of the protests began to show up on YouTube
because the government began limiting foreign journalists and blocking internet sites.
March 26 was the first day that the government showed that it was willing to make some
concessions regarding protestor demands. The regime released information that the emergency
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laws set into place over 30 years before would be lifted, 200 political prisoners would be
released and the entire government resigned. 202 Just three days later, hundreds of thousands
demonstrated in support of President al-Assad in, Aleppo, Damascus, al-Hasaka, Homs Hama
and Tartous. 203

Within 24 hours al-Assad continued to note a repeat of previous foreign

dictators, that foreign conspirators were at fault for the uprising and that they were attempting to
drive a wedge amongst Syria’s society, and therefore, the emergency put into place by his father,
Hafez-al Assad, would not be lifted as previously confirmed and that it would be reviewed for
further study. 204
On April 1, thousands of Syrians citizens joined protesters in multiple cities around Syria.
Security forces again opened fire killing dozens. 205 Further south, in a small city outside Daraa, a
demonstrator was killed during a protest. As the protests began to grow, international journalists
began to pay more attention and started reporting more frequently on the protests. The regime in
Syria began banning all foreign media and closed its borders. In what can be signs of desperation
or attempts to hold off further protests, the Syrian government dropped a law barring teachers
with niqabs from teaching students, granted citizenship to many of the country’s Kurdish
minority, and closed a recently opened casino that was shut down many years before. 206
On April 19, al-Assad signed the decrees for ending the state of emergency, abolishing
the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC), as well as permitting the right to peaceful
demonstrations; however, permits from the government were necessary. Despite these actions,
the protests continued to grow, and by April 22, larger scale protests took place in the capital,
Damascus and many cities throughout Syria. 207
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Finally, on April 25, the Syrian regime

deployed tanks and soldiers to the Southern city of Daraa and also cut off all forms of
communication and water. At this point, a full scale siege was taking place in Daraa to stop the
protesters. Reports from sources aired and said that troops from various regiments were not
taking part in the siege and refusing orders. 208 Those same soldiers were being fired upon by
loyalist forces commanded by the president’s brother, Maher al-Assad. 209 This was a sign of
things to come.

Remarks

Approximately two months into the peaceful protests, over 1,000 protesters had been
killed and thousands wounded. Many thousands had also been detained and held in infamous
Syrian jails. While Hezbollah continues to remain silent, the word on the street is that the
protesters will not be able to bring down the government by force, but that the economy was in
dire straits. Tourism, accounting to 18 percent of the economy has come to a standstill. A $900
million project to build power plants, one among many, has been scrapped. 210 The economy has
been affected to such an extent that the government is reverting to pay subsidies on certain goods
hoping to placate the populace. The government does not have the billions of dollars needed to
buy out the citizenry as has been done by Saudi Arabia and others. Therefore, they are offering
subsidies they can ill afford. This has more potential of bringing down the government than the
protests themselves.

As investors continue to get out of the Syrian market, analysts are

predicting a financial meltdown within 6 months time, meaning Assad’s time could be running
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out. In turn, if Hezbollah loses one of its primary patrons, it could have massive repercussions
on the region as a whole.
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CHAPTER V: FORCE IN A NEW MILIEU
Introduction

This thesis has argued that Israel has been the major force behind the increase of
Hezbollah power over the past three decades.

While Syria and Iran have been strong

contributors of Hezbollah’s rise in Lebanon, the previous chapters have provided an overview of
how Hezbollah was able to establish itself and advance into a social and political organization as
well as a powerful military influence in Southwest Asia. Hezbollah has also been able to solidify
itself not only within Lebanon, but also with the Islamic republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab
republic, two very different countries aligning themselves in the region based on real and
perceived threats. Lacking Israeli military actions in Lebanon during the early 1980s, Hezbollah
may have found great difficulty establishing itself.
Internationally, Hezbollah is identified as a terrorist organization, grown out of the
Middle East and based on alleged Islamic tenants and homegrown militancy in Lebanon.

At

times researchers have ignored the real causes leading to the creation and growth of Hezbollah in
the region and on the international stage. This final chapter will place Israeli military incursions
as the primary cause for the growth of Hezbollah power and argue that without Israel’s use of
excessive force during incursions into Lebanon, it is quite possible that Hezbollah may have
never been established and would not have grown into the current threat that exists today.
The evident application of this study is how to better understand not just the reasons for
the growth of Hezbollah power but also, the continued ability of Hezbollah to morph and remain
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viable despite the withdrawal of Israel from Southern Lebanon. Israeli military incursions in the
region have been able to create a situation where Hezbollah has become active, not only as a
resistance movement but also as a social, political, and economic force in the region. This comes
mainly from its ability to follow or gauge Arab public opinion. The literature has been expanded
by showing Israel’s role in the growth of Hezbollah power of the last thirty years.

Backlash

As discussed in chapter one, two parties in conflict such as Israel and Hezbollah, may
lead to one party, Israel in this case, attempting to quickly and easily win a battle using
overwhelming military force.

One party will assume that the opposition will submit and the

conflict will come to an end. Unfortunately, as time as shown, the use of disproportionate force
in Southwest Asia and throughout the world can cause reactive movements that become more of
a problem than the initial issue. It is a natural human reaction not to want to do certain things
against your will.

In the case of Israeli incursions into Lebanon, the local Shiite Muslim

population was pushed enough that they decided to take matters into their own hands. Israel’s
use of force led to the creation of Hezbollah as a fighting force and the attempt to limit Israeli
actions in the region based on the needs of the local population. As Israel did not consider the
long-term consequences of its disproportionate use of force, it was unable to foresee the response
of the Muslim Shiites in the south of Lebanon and possible negative long term affects against
Israel itself. Israel has shown that some military operations can be counterproductive.
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Initially, the Shiites of Southern Lebanon submitted to Israel’s use of force, believing that
they would be free from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; however, as time went on, they became
resentful and began working to build up their own powerbase so that they could resist the Israeli
military. The excessive uses of force provided an added impetus for the people of Southern
Lebanon to band together and create a fighting force. For example, had Israel not entered and
occupied South Lebanon, the catalyst would not have been created and Iran may not have seen
an opportunity to create Hezbollah in Lebanon as a method to counter Israel. While there may
still have been resentment towards Israel, it would not have been deep enough to take action. In
Israel’s case, the military force was so harsh, it created an intense backlash.

This resentment towards Israel’s repeated incursions into Lebanon served to further
embolden and escalate Hezbollah’s behavior and pushed them to diversify their range of
services, resulting in the ability of Hezbollah to also provide healthcare, loans, schooling and
social assistance. Case in point, Hezbollah was at the forefront of rebuilding Lebanese schools,
hospitals and community centers immediately after the 2006 incursion into Lebanon. Through
multiple military incursions by Israel, Hezbollah adapted to being able to provide relief
operations for its own community as well as for others in Lebanon. Hezbollah spent millions of
dollars every month delivering medicines, organizing recreational activities for displaced
children and adults, providing temporary shelters and even hot meals. Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah pledged assistance to anyone whose home or business was destroyed.

In fact,

Hezbollah has become so adept that within 24 hours of the 2006 cease-fire, a Lebanese television
station reported that Hezbollah had hotlines ready to assist refugees based on their location of
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residence and that teams were being sent out to assess the damage and assist in reconstruction
planning.

Difficulties also arise because Hezbollah lacks the means to win a decisive battle against
the Israeli military. While Hezbollah may do what is required to defend against past Israeli
incursions, they will continue to look for a long-term solution against Israel which creates a
dangerous precedent. Hezbollah is continually looking to acquire more sophisticated weaponry.
While it is still decades away from being on par with Israeli technology, Hezbollah is inching
closer and closer.

Despite the fact that the 22-year Israeli occupation of Lebanon has come to an end, the
Southern Lebanese have felt like victims of aggression and based on these feelings, Hezbollah
will continue to build up its power structure. As stated in chapter one, Israeli incursions have
lead to a costly and escalating arms race where both Israel, via support from the United States,
and Hezbollah, via support from Iran and Syria, have devoted an even greater share of their
assets towards increasing weapons stockpiles. This accumulation of weapons confirms that on
the Israeli side, they will attempt to deter Hezbollah from firing missiles onto Israeli territory,
and on Hezbollah’s side, they have the power to defend themselves from Israeli firepower.
Regardless of the reasoning, the end result is the continuing escalation of violence rather than
finding a solution to the problem.

Furthermore, Israel’s disproportionate use of force was widely deemed illegitimate.
Force should only be used as a last resort and Israel’s justifications for overwhelming use of
force has not been made to convince many in the region as well as many throughout the
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international community.

In addition, military force used against civilian targets is deemed

unacceptable. These factors allow Hezbollah leeway in terms of their military operations within
Lebanon. While they may be firing from civilian areas, Israel used disproportionate force in
retaliating towards fire from within those areas.

Had Israel not chosen to use the strategy of military incursions, they would have been
able to limit the amount of destruction in South Lebanon. For example, Israel could have
attempted to use diplomatic means to achieve its goals, especially with the backing of the United
States Government.

Additionally, the legitimization of the use of force also requires

justification. While Israel has attempted to justify its actions, its justifications have not been
sufficient for the level of military force used within Lebanon, leading to massive resentment,
which has resulted in the continued backing of Hezbollah and organizations like it.

Strategic Mistakes

In Chapter Two, Lebanon and the 1982, 1996 and 2006 Israeli incursions were discussed.
The Israeli mentality is discussed showing that issues are seen as a zero-sum game where there is
an “us versus them” mentality. This mentality leaves little room for negotiations. . A lack of
trust throughout the world causes Israeli military strategists to plan for the worst and the related
actions; the initial invasion of Lebanon in 1982 among others, led to disregard for possible
reactions resulting from the Shiite Muslim population. This reasoning, as discussed earlier, also
justifies Israeli military actions as being defensive rather than offensive in nature. Hezbollah’s
guerrilla warfare strategy has made it very difficult for Israel to respond without heavy collateral
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damage. Hezbollah has also been successful in obtaining support from a number of religious and
ethnic groups within Lebanon. Israel also failed to assess Hezbollah’s strength resulting in
inappropriate strategies for multiple incursions.

Israel formal military strategy against an

asymmetric opponent has repeatedly been a failure.

First in 1982, Israel generated the conditions necessary for the birth of Hezbollah.
Starting with the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the dislodging of the PLO, the creation of
Hezbollah was discussed along with an explanation of the history of Hezbollah and its
connection to Israeli military incursions in Lebanon. These incursions were accomplished by
entering Palestinian-held areas with disregard for the Shiite minority. The initial goodwill
created at the riddance of Palestinian fighters in Shiite neighborhoods quickly turned into
resentment against Israeli activity in the region. The increased resentment by the local Shiite
population eventually turned into action, leading to the creation of a militant group in Israel’s
backyard.

Between 1982 and 1996, Hezbollah was able to expand itself from merely a small
fighting force to a strong political entity in Lebanon. Israel’s military attempt to punish the
Lebanese population failed. Instead, Hezbollah was supported by a large swath of the Lebanese
society and they were able to gain a large amount of political power in the process. Once again,
this “make or break” Israeli mentality failed Israel in the short and long run in dealing with
Hezbollah.

Finally, the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel solidified Hezbollah as a stable actor
in the region.

Both Iran and Syria have become more willing to back Hezbollah with
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sophisticated weaponry, as well as political and economic support. Hezbollah has also proven
that it can defend and sustain itself within the region, it has also been able to prove its usefulness
to a secular Arab dictatorship as well as to a religious Iranian democracy. Hezbollah has been so
successful that it is purported to have been given scud missiles, a definite game changer in the
region and one that can put both Syria and Iran in the sights of Israel’s military hawks. 211

In Chapter Three, Iranian ideology was discussed along with the Hawala system for
transferring money and its importance in funding Hezbollah. Iran has long wanted to export its
revolution throughout the Arab world, but has been hard-pressed to find an opening throughout
the years. After the Israeli invasion in 1982, Iran saw that it could exploit a weak spot amongst
the Arab Shiite Muslims living in Southern Lebanon. This opportunity began with a small
number of Pasdaran troops training local Lebanese and has since taken a life of its own.
Historically, Israel has not had to deal with this phenomenon of militant groups being able to
withstand its military assaults. Palestinian factions were never able to maintain their positions
since Arab countries were sympathetic to their cause, but limited in their support. Once these
limits were crossed, such as occurred in Jordan and Lebanon, the Palestinians had to trade in
their weapons and once again become displaced in other locations. 212 In Hezbollah’s case, the
fighters are part and parcel of the resistance movement in the area. Because of this, Iran has
been able to parley its own interests and use the situation in Lebanon to its benefit while
benefiting the Lebanese as well.

In Chapter Four, the historical context of Syria and its relations with both Lebanon and
Iran are discussed. This partnership leads to Syrian involvement with Hezbollah and how this
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militant organization is used to counter Israeli policy in Lebanon and throughout the region.
Importantly, in light of the current protests sweeping the region, the Syrian government does not
have the funds needed to placate its citizenry as has been done by Saudi Arabia and the GCC
regimes to deal with their own internal uprisings. The Syrian protesters, therefore, have more of
a possibility to bring down the government due to financial difficulties rather than through
peaceful protests. As major investors continue to watch the economic situation in Syria, the
longer the protests last, the worse off the government is in terms of keeping the regime together.
Assad’s time may be running out.
All the while, Hezbollah is quiet as it watches one of its two primary patrons fight for its
survival. Without their support, Hezbollah could become isolated and lose its primary backers.
Israel on the other hand, is studying the situation to see whether the devil they know will
continue to be better than the one that may come about should the regime fall.

Time to Rethink Israeli Strategy

The Hezbollah-Israel conflict will last for many decades to come unless a breakthrough is
agreed upon between both Hezbollah and Israel. However, the situation does not mean that both
sides are destined for continuous battles. While the U.S. is attempting to drive a wedge between
Iran and Syria, the strategy has had limited results. Both nations are being approached with a
Western “carrot and stick” philosophy that takes limited consideration for long-term goals. The
United States must take a look at its current “divide and conquer” philosophy and replace it with
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one that is more in tune with the intricacies of the region. Israel understands that in the short
term, it has the upper hand and can bide it’s time with Hezbollah continuing its current strategy
of using overwhelming force despite international opinion. Israel also knows that demographics
are quickly changing and that success in future conflicts will be more difficult to achieve.
Hezbollah, on the other hand, understand that it must only survive to find success. As long as
Hezbollah can maintain its armaments, and maintain its viability in Lebanese politics, it will
continue to be a force in the region.

Final Remarks

Israel’s scientific, financial and technological abilities can contribute to the development
of Southwest Asia and North Africa, the Arab Levant and Mashriq. This is conditioned upon
ending the occupation, guaranteeing security for Israel and Israel’s recognition in the region.
Currently, these issues are in Israel’s favor and some Arab governments are willing to accept
these conditions while others have to contend with new realities relating to the Arab Spring.
With closed borders and virtually no integration, Israel will continue to be viewed as a pariah
state with a limited, vested interest in the region. The current socioeconomic order, increased
religious fundamentalism on both sides and the accumulation of arms will certainly create an
ever-increasing gap between Jews in Israel and backers of Hezbollah and many anti-Israel
groups in the region. Israel cannot afford to live in the region with the façade of stability while
neglecting its neighbors and the needs and expectations of the surrounding Arab populations.
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The creation and impact of Hezbollah has been felt most radically by Israel and by the
countries surrounding it. Hezbollah’s network of backers has been established over decades in
South Lebanon and because of this, it is the center of resistance against Israeli aspirations in the
region. As a result, the effects of Hezbollah have largely been limited to Southwest Asia, with
limited occurrences outside of the region. More importantly, no simple answer exists as to how
Hezbollah can be stopped without addressing the core causes of why this organization was
originally formed and how its power has increased over the last three decades. International
organizations must play a more constructive role, along with the United States, rather than trying
to create further divisions amongst the players in the region, especially amongst Syria and Iran as
they understand that their long-term interests do not necessarily align with those of the U.S. and
Israel.
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